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CATHOLIC BANKRUPTCY
INTRODUCrION
In January 2002, the Boston Globe reported the story of Father
John J. Geoghan of the Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, calling
public attention to what is now often called the "Catholic sex abuse
scandal."1 The Globe revealed that 130 had people accused Geoghan
of sexually abusing them as children.2 The story focused public
scrutiny squarely on the archdiocese itself by reporting that it had
known about Geoghan's abuse of children and had responded to the
problem by moving the priest from one parish to another. The
Boston scandal actually can be traced back to 2001, when the Boston
Globe successfully intervened in a civil lawsuit brought by alleged
victims against Geoghan and also prevailed in having the court open
previously sealed records recounting the archdiocese's past
supervision of the priest.4 In that same year, the U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops reported a peak number of 3,300 people who came
forward with sex-abuse allegations against priests nationwide.' In
2004, the most recent year reported by the bishops' conference, more
than 1,000 people reported abuse, and the Catholic Church spent
$157 million on legal settlements and other costs related to the
reports of abuse.6 The 2004 figures brought the total numbers from
1950-2004 to 11,750 alleged victims, 5,148 accused priests, and $840
million in abuse-related expenses.7 In particular, the financial costs
associated with the scandal have prompted three Catholic dioceses to
file for bankruptcy.
In July 2004, the Archdiocese of Portland, Oregon, filed a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, citing its desire to resolve
1. Matt Carroll et al., Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 6, 2002, at Al. For a compilation of the Boston Globe's reporting on the sex-abuse
scandal from 2002 to present, see also Spotlight Investigation: Abuse in the Catholic
Church, BOSTON GLOBE, http://www.boston.con/globe/spotlight/abuse (last visited Nov.
10, 2005).
2. Carroll et al., supra note 1.
3. See id.
4. See Leary v. Geoghan, Nos. 99-0371, 99-1109, 2001 WL 1902393, at *8-9 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Nov. 26,2001).
5. Alan Cooperman, Last Year, 1,000 Told of Abuse by Priests, WASH. POST, Feb.
20, 2005, at Al.
6. Id. The patterns within the 2004 statistics were representative of those found in a
major study of church sex-abuse from 1950-2002. Id. Among the alleged victims, about
eighty percent were male, the majority reported that they were abused between the ages
of ten and fourteen, and most reported that they were abused in the 1960s and 1970s. Id.
7. Id. But Cooperman cautions that "[i]nterpretation of the statistics [is] also
complicated by a lack of data for 2003. That is because the... study compiled statistics for
each year from 1950 to 2002. Then the bishops voted to update the study annually
beginning in 2004." Id.
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outstanding claims against it stemming from alleged sexual abuse by
priests employed by the archdiocese. 8  As the bankruptcy judge
presiding over the case noted, the archdiocese's stated reasons for
filing were "to resolve, fairly, finally and in a global fashion, the
sexual abuse claims asserted against it."9  It was the first Catholic
diocese to file for bankruptcy and one of only a few religious
organizations to ever file. 10
In its Chapter 11 petition, the Portland archdiocese reported
assets of $50 million or less." This amount excluded parish assets
even though most parish property is held by the archbishop of the
archdiocese under Oregon's state corporate law.' The petition was
filed the same week that several of the civil trials against the
archdiocese were set to start, drawing criticism from alleged sex-
abuse victims that the filing was a tactic to delay and even reduce the
8. Ashbel S. Green & Steve Woodward, Filing for Bankruptcy Halts Priest Abuse
Trial, OREGONIAN (Portland), July 7, 2004, at Al, available at 2004 WLNR 17920114. See
generally 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1174 (Supp. V 2005) (governing Chapter 11 bankruptcy
filings, generally known as the reorganization chapter of the bankruptcy code). The
Bankruptcy Code was amended in 2005. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
Throughout this Comment, citations to the Code will be to Supplement V of the 2005
United States Code Annotated so that the most current version of the Code is cited.
However, the revisions enacted by BAPCPA only affect cases filed on or after October 17,
2005. BAPCPA § 501(a), 119 Stat. at 216 (providing that "this Act and the amendments
made by this Act shall take effect 180 days after [April 20, 2005]"). Thus, the Portland,
Tucson, and Spokane cases discussed in this Comment are not affected by these revisions.
See id. § 1501(b)(1), 119 Stat. at 216 (providing that "the amendments made by this Act
shall not apply with respect to cases commenced.., before the effective date"). Generally
speaking, the revisions to the Code do not appear to have a major impact on the issues
discussed in this Comment, even for cases that may be filed after BAPCPA's effective
date. The revisions that may have an impact will be noted and briefly discussed.
9. In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 44 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) 54, at
246 (Bankr. D. Or. Jan. 10, 2005).
10. See Green & Woodward, supra note 8. For a sampling of cases involving churches
or religious groups that have filed for bankruptcy, see generally Universal Life Church,
Inc. v. United States (In re Universal Life Church, Inc.), 128 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1997),
addressing a debtor religious organization's challenge to the Internal Revenue Service's
revocation of its tax-exempt status; All Denominational New Church v. Pelofsky (In re All
Denominational New Church), 268 B.R. 536 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001), dismissing a church's
Chapter 11 case based on its inability to implement a plan and on its failure to file monthly
operating reports; In re Beulah Church of God in Christ Jesus, Inc., 316 B.R. 41 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2004), determining that a bulk, preconfirmation sale of a debtor church's assets
was exempt from local transfer tax; Mother African Union Methodist Church v. Conference
of African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church (In re Conference of African
Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church), 184 B.R. 207 (Bankr. D. Del. 1995),
dismissing a Chapter 7 case filed by an association of churches.
11. Green & Woodward, supra note 8.
12. Id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 65.067 (1997) (defining a corporation sole).
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amount of money the archdiocese would have to pay. 3 Parishes of
the archdiocese attempted to protect their assets from being included
in the archdiocese's bankruptcy estate by organizing a parish's
committee. 4 The bankruptcy judge approved the appointment of a
future claims representative to represent the interests of not-yet-
matured tort claims against the church. 5
In September 2004, the Catholic Diocese of Tucson, Arizona,
also filed a Chapter 11 petition.16 Although it was the second to file, 7
the Tucson diocese was the first to emerge from the bankruptcy
process when its reorganization plan was confirmed on July 11, 2005.18
The plan calls for an initial payment of $10 million to forty-five
victims and five relatives of victims. 9 The plan also sets up a fund in
the amount of $22.2 million for future claimants.20 Apparently, the
Tucson case avoided having the diocese-parish property issue decided
by the court by striking a compromise in the plan: the parishes will
contribute $2 million to the future claimant fund.2'
Finally, on December 6, 2004, the Diocese of Spokane,
Washington, filed for Chapter 11.22 In its petition, the diocese
excluded parish assets, listing its assets as totaling $11 million and
claiming liabilities of $81 million-$76 million of which it attributed
to sex-abuse lawsuits.23  Among its reasons for filing were "hop[es
that] the court will help provide a clearer picture of its financial
liability in mounting sex-abuse lawsuits and goad its reluctant insurers
into paying some of the claims. 24
13. See Green & Woodward, supra note 8.
14. Nancy Haught & Steve Woodward, Parishes Attempt To Shield Assets from
Seizure in Bankruptcy of Archdiocese, OREGONIAN (Portland), Sept. 9, 2004, at B1, 2004
WLNR 17933844.
15. In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 44 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) 54, at
244 (Bankr. D. Or. Jan. 10, 2005). In this unpublished memorandum opinion, the
bankruptcy judge presiding over the Portland case explained the basis of her November
19, 2004, order approving a future claims representative.
16. Michael Clancy, Diocese Motions Granted, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Phoenix), Sept. 29,
2004, at 3B, available at 2004 WLNR 18607757.
17. Michael Clancy, Diocese Files for Bankruptcy, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Phoenix), Sept.
21, 2004, at 1A, available at 2004 WLNR 16360981.
18. Sheryl Kornman, Diocese To Pay $10M Upfront as Plan OK'd, TUCSON CITIZEN,




22. Janet I. Tu, Spokane Diocese Files Bankruptcy, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 7, 2004, at
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These three filings, as well as other recent developments, signal
that other dioceses might follow suit and file Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petitions." The filings of these religious organizations raise myriad
issues, the most important of which concerns which assets will
become property of the bankruptcy estate in each case.26 While
nothing in the federal Bankruptcy Code ("the Code") necessarily
precludes a church or religious organization from filing for
bankruptcy, certain provisions in the Code suggest that such filings
were not originally contemplated.27 It is difficult to anticipate how
the Code will accommodate these bankruptcies-if at all.
The bankruptcy judge's decision concerning what property is
included in each diocese's bankruptcy estate28 also determines the
minimum distribution to which the sex-abuse claimants are entitled.29
25. Other developments that are interesting in light of these filings include stories of
several dioceses in California transferring title of various properties to parishes in an
alleged effort to shield those assets from any judgments resulting from sex-abuse suits
against the dioceses. Jean Guccione, Dioceses Accused of Moving Assets To Avoid Paying
Sex-Abuse Claims, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2004, at B6. Plaintiffs in these California cases
claim this was done strategically, days before a new state law went into effect permitting
past abuse victims to bring actions against the dioceses. Id. The Boston archdiocese is in
such financial trouble that it is planning to close many parishes. Laura Crimaldi,
Archdiocese Seeing Red as Parishes Set To Close, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 18, 2005, at 30,
available at 2005 WLNR 2352532. Interestingly, in 2003, experts speculated that the
Boston archdiocese might be the first to file Chapter 11. Michael Paulson, O'Malley Plans
Aggressive Cuts, Vows To Decide Church Closings as Early as June, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
17, 2003, at Al (discussing how the archdiocese prevented bankruptcy by borrowing
money and consolidating parishes). That did not turn out to be the case, but the
speculation led to some interesting legal scholarship. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Avoiding Moral Bankruptcy, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1181 (2003) (discussing the possibility of an
archdiocese or church filing for bankruptcy).
26. See Skeel, supra note 25, at 1188-92 (discussing the effect of bankruptcy on an
archdiocese's assets).
27. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(13) (Supp. V 2005) (defining "debtor" for the purposes of
the Code as a "person or municipality concerning which a case under this title has been
commenced"). Under the Code, a "person" includes a corporation; each diocese is
designated as a corporation. Id. § 101(41); see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 65.067(i) (1997)
(describing the corporate form for religious organizations). These provisions clearly do
not preclude a church from filing for bankruptcy. However, § 1104 of the Code, which
allows the court to appoint a trustee where the court finds "cause," including "fraud,
dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement," would involve the court appointing
a trustee to take over operation of the church from the bishop. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1).
As will be discussed in Part III, infra, such an appointment would be so problematic that it
seems unlikely that Congress ever really thought about the possibility of it being used in
the context of church operations.
28. See generally 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (defining "property of the estate").
29. Id. § 1141; see also id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (requiring that debtors under Chapter
11 must pay their creditors at least what creditors would have received in a Chapter 7
liquidation, where all eligible assets are sold to pay off creditors). This determination has
been made in the Spokane case. See discussion of this case infra Parts III and IV.
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In this sense, the diocesan bankruptcies are like almost any other
bankruptcy: the major battles are about how much property will be
distributed and, in turn, what each creditor will get. The diocesan
bankruptcies have a special complexity-like that of the mass torts
bankruptcies of the 1980s to today.30  However, the diocesan
bankruptcies are even more unique than the mass torts cases, because
the dioceses have chosen bankruptcy as a new forum for their latest
defensive battle in an ongoing conflict between the dioceses and sex-
abuse claimants allegedly harmed by the dioceses' priests. For
example, in Portland, the archbishop insists that "under Canon law,
the centuries-old law that governs the Catholic Church, he does not
have the authority to tap trusts that have been bequeathed to the
church ... [a]nd parish property-which includes churches and parish
donations--does not belong to the archdiocese."31 On the other side,
the claimants argue that "under civil law, the archdiocese itself-not
the parishes-is the owner of record of at least $300 million in
property. '32 These positions, taken by the archdiocese and claimants
in Portland highlight that the diocesan bankruptcies are not just about
reordering finances and limiting liability but, instead, are about two
different bodies of law. This conflict between civil and canon law
makes these cases unique among even the most unusual bankruptcy
cases. This conflict implicates the First Amendment, particularly with
the issue of whether to apply civil law or canon law in determining
what property will become part of the diocesan bankruptcy estate.
This Comment discusses issues that have been raised or are likely
to be raised in the diocesan bankruptcies, especially the diocese-
parish property issue at the heart of this conflict. In its discussion,
this Comment notes the relative advantages and disadvantages to the
dioceses and the sex-abuse claimants in their positions as opponents.
Part I discusses the general applicability of Chapter 11 and its policies
as background for the larger discussion of the respective positions of
the dioceses as debtors and the sex-abuse claimants as creditors. Part
I concludes by discussing how the mass torts bankruptcies
demonstrate how flexible and equitable the Chapter 11 process is.
Part II examines the motion to dismiss the church's bankruptcy case
for lack of good faith and its viability as a litigation tool for the sex-
abuse claimants. Part III focuses on the relevant definitions of
30. See generally Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Mass Torts
Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2045 (2000) (giving background on mass torts cases and
discussing the bankruptcy process's accommodation of these cases).
31. Green & Woodward, supra note 8.
32. Id.
2005]
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diocesan property found in the Code, state law, and church canon law
and how each definition plays to the relative advantage of the
dioceses and sex-abuse claimants. Part IV discusses First
Amendment case law and its implications for the dioceses and their
parishioners, including sex-abuse claimants. Ultimately, this
Comment concludes that the bankruptcy process is equipped to
address the complexities of a diocesan bankruptcy.33
I. CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. Dioceses as Debtors, Sex-Abuse Claimants as Creditors
The dioceses in Portland, Tucson, and Spokane were able to file
Chapter 11 bankruptcy because any "person" can file.' Under the
Code, "person" includes a corporation.35 Dioceses and other religious
organizations are organized as special types of corporations under the
laws of their respective states.3 6 Sex-abuse claimants are considered
creditors under the Code, because a creditor includes any "entity that
has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before" the
filing of the bankruptcy petition.37 "Claim" is broadly defined by the
Code to include any "right to payment, whether or not such right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured,
or unsecured.""a For the sex-abuse claimants, creditor status will be
given to any person who files a claim based on abuse that occurred
before the debtor filed for bankruptcy, or "pre-petition."39 Again,
because of the broad definition of "claim," sex-abuse claimants will
be creditors regardless of whether their claims against the diocese
33. What this Comment does not fully address is whether the law should solve this
problem for the dioceses.
34. See § 109(d) (providing that "a person that may be a debtor under chapter 7 ...
may be a debtor under chapter 11"); see also id. § 109(b)(1)-(3) (setting out the eligibility
requirements for Chapter 7, which exclude from eligibility certain insurance companies,
banks, and other financial institutions).
35. Id. § 101(41) (defining "person" to include an "individual, partnership, and
corporation").
36. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-11901 to -11908 (2004) (describing the
corporate form for religious organizations); OR. REV. STAT. § 65.067(1) (1997) (same);
WASH. REV. CODE § 24.12.010 (2002) (same). The relevance of the special corporate
form under state law is discussed in Part III.B, infra.
37. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(10)(A).
38. Id. § 101(5)(A).
39. See id. § 101(10), (42).
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were settled pre-petition, pending at the time of petition, or filed
post-petition.4 °
B. Policies of Chapter 11
The primary policy objectives of the Bankruptcy Code are: (1)
to give the financially troubled debtor an opportunity for a fresh start
and (2) to pay creditors in an orderly and equitable manner.4
Although these two policy objectives may sometimes seem in conflict
with each other, the goal of the bankruptcy process generally is to
achieve both goals to the greatest extent possible-balancing each as
the Code or equity requires.42
Chapter 11 is the reorganization chapter of the Code.43 It
permits the debtor to propose a plan under which the debtor can
reorganize its business or financial affairs or effect an orderly
liquidation of its property." The Chapter 11 process is therefore
distinct from the Chapter 7 liquidation process wherein the debtor
liquidates all assets to pay off creditors.45 For the business or
corporate debtor, Chapter 7 liquidation results in the cessation of
operations and for the individual, the selling of all non-exempt
assets.46  Though the provisions of Chapter 11 are primarily geared
40. See id. § 101(5), (10), (42).
41. In Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991), the United States Supreme Court
observed:
This Court has certainly acknowledged that a central purpose of the Code is to
provide a procedure by which certain insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs,
make peace with their creditors, and enjoy "a new opportunity in life and a clear
field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
preexisting debt." But in the same breath that we have invoked this "fresh start"
policy, we have been careful to explain that the Act limits the opportunity for a
completely unencumbered new beginning to the "honest but unfortunate debtor."
Id. at 286-87 (citation omitted) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244
(1934)).
42. See id.
43. See §§ 1101-1174 (listing the title of chapter 11 as "Reorganization."); see also id
§ 1121(a) (stating "[tihe debtor may file a plan"). This "plan," if later confirmed by the
court under § 1129, has the effect of "vest[ing] all of the property of the estate in the
debtor." Id. § 1141(b). This means that all property remains in the control of the debtor
for the purposes of completing the plan according to the provisions of the reorganization
plan. Id.
44. See id. § 1123 (specifying the contents of the reorganization plan); id. § 1129
(stating the requirements for confirmation of the reorganizational plan to be confirmed);
id. § 1141 (describing the effect of plan confirmation).
45. See id. § 726 (outlining the distribution process for property of the estate).
46. Id.; see also id. § 522 (allowing exemptions for certain kinds of property).
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towards business debtors, entities not engaged in business also qualify
for relief under Chapter 11. 47
A key policy preference under Chapter 11 of the Code is for the
debtor to be able to continue to operate and then reorganize its
business rather than liquidating. 8 The rationale behind this policy is
that continued operation may enable the debtor to preserve a "going
concern value of the business" that is greater than the liquidation
value.49 Other things of value preserved by reorganization may
include employee jobs and community tax bases." Though the
dioceses do not operate businesses in the general sense, they do
operate churches, schools, and other charities, which the Chapter 11
petition permits them to continue operating." Thus, filing for
bankruptcy allows the dioceses to continue operating while the details
of a plan to pay off their creditors, the largest group of which is sex-
abuse claimants, can be formulated.5 2  In contrast, outside of
bankruptcy, the dioceses could continue operating only to the extent
their financial solvency allowed, given all the costs of litigation.53
In pursuit of this policy objective that permits the debtor to
continue operating, the Code is written to encourage debtors to file
Chapter 11 while reorganization is still possible-as opposed to being
in a position where liquidation is the only option-and gives such
debtors certain incentives for filing.54 First, the Code presumes that
the debtor's business will continue to operate.5 Second, the debtor
47. See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991); see also § 109 (stating who may be
a debtor).




51. See Michael Clancy, Tucson Diocese Faces Liquidation, ARIZ. REPUBLIC
(Phoenix), Nov. 7, 2004, at 1B, available at 2004 WLNR 15250822; Green & Woodward,
supra note 8.
52. See Green & Woodward, supra note 8 (explaining how the sex-abuse lawsuits
were the reason the Portland archdiocese filed and how filing allows them to continue
operating while formulating a reorganization plan).
53. See, e.g., id. (explaining the Portland archdiocese's position that they "could not
risk a huge verdict"); Steve Woodward, Judge Wary of Legal Fees Confronting
Archdiocese, OREGONIAN (Portland), Feb. 22, 2005, at Al, available at 2005 WLNR
2909815 (discussing the Portland bankruptcy judge's concern over accumulating legal fees
in the archdiocese's Chapter 11 case).
54. See 7 COLLIER, supra note 48, 1100.01 (giving an overview of Chapter 11
policies).
55. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1108 (Supp. V. 2005) (authorizing operation of the debtor's
business unless the court orders otherwise).
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remains "in possession" of its business.56 This means that the debtor
in possession (the "DIP") will retain control of the business during
the entire bankruptcy process unless it can be shown that a trustee
should be appointed because the DIP has mismanaged the business or
there are other circumstances constituting "cause" for such an
appointment.57 Where the court orders appointment of a trustee, the
debtor's creditors elect a "disinterested person" to serve as the
trustee.58 The trustee, instead of the DIP, then operates the
business.59 But appointment of a trustee is the exception, not the
rule.6 ° In most bankruptcy cases, the DIP operates the business and is
vested generally with the rights, powers, and duties that an appointed
trustee would have.61  This means that whenever "trustee" is
mentioned in Chapter 11, the DIP has the same powers.62 This
includes giving the DIP considerable control over plan negotiations.63
This position of control works to the advantage of the dioceses by
allowing them the first opportunity to propose a plan to settle the sex-
abuse claims-the significance of which is discussed in Part III.A,
infra.
C. Protection and Control of the Diocesan Assets as Property of the
Estate and by Operation of the Automatic Stay
Not only does the debtor usually maintain control of its
operations, the debtor's property is also protected for the duration of
the bankruptcy proceeding. Once a Chapter 11 petition is filed, an
56. See id. § 1101 (defining "debtor in possession" ("DIP")); id. § 1107(a) (providing
the DIP with most of the powers and duties of a "trustee" under Chapter 11); id. § 1108
(authorizing the trustee-and by extension the DIP because of the rights and powers
granted to the DIP under § 1107-to operate the debtor's business).
57. See id. § 1104(a). Note that § 1104(a) refers to "gross mismanagement of the
affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or after the commencement of
the case." Id. § 1104(a)(1) (emphasis added). This at least implies that the sex-abuse
claimants could argue for appointment of a trustee on the basis of mismanagement if the
same leadership were in place at the time of their alleged injuries and mismanaged the
handling of employment matters related to priests. However, as is discussed in Part IV.B,
infra, appointment of a trustee seems especially unlikely given the First Amendment
implications of a court-appointed individual controlling the day-to-day operations of the
dioceses.
58. Id. § 1104(b).
59. Id. § 1108.
60. See 7 COLLIER, supra note 48, 1100.01 (noting Chapter 11's presumption "that
the debtor will remain in possession ... unless it can be established that cause exists for
appointment of a trustee").
61. § 1107(a).
62. Id.
63. See id. § 1121.
2005]
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estate is created that includes virtually all of the debtor's property.64
Section 541 of the Code defines what becomes "property of the
estate."65 This places all property of the estate under the jurisdiction
and protection of the bankruptcy court. This is a double-edged sword
for the dioceses, because although their assets are protected from
state court litigation and possible depletion as each of those cases is
decided, the bankruptcy court will also get to decide which assets are
available for distribution. The difficulties that loom in deciding what
property comprises the diocesan bankruptcy estates are discussed in
more detail in Part III.B, infra.
The primary protection of the diocesan assets is provided by an
automatic stay of any actions to collect on pre-petition claims or to
otherwise interfere with property of the estate.66  The stay
automatically became effective the day the dioceses filed their
petitions.67  The stay is broad in scope, applying to all lawsuits
pending against the dioceses arising from alleged pre-petition sex-
abuse.6' The stay helps the dioceses by putting all litigation against
them on hold, primarily protecting them from the ongoing costs of
litigation while they try to formulate a plan that will deal with their
debt in a manageable way. This protection of the dioceses comes at
the expense of the sex-abuse claimants, because their causes of action
are either paused while in progress or delayed from starting.69
Further, any sex-abuse claimants that obtained judgments against the
dioceses before the dioceses filed their petitions are stayed from
collecting on those judgments.7" This moves the sex-abuse claimants
from the offensive position of pursuing their claims against the
dioceses to the defensive position of waiting for the bankruptcy
64. See id. § 541(a) ("The commencement of a case under ... this title creates an
estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by
whomever held....").
65. See id. § 541(a)(1) (including as property of the estate, "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case," subject to a few
exceptions provided elsewhere in § 541).
66. See id. § 362.
67. See id. § 362(a) (noting that "a petition filed under ... this title ... operates as a
stay, applicable to all entities").
68. See id. § 362(a)(1) (applying the automatic stay to "the commencement or
continuation ... of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the
debtor that was or could have been commenced" before debtor's filing of the petition)
(emphasis added).
69. See id.
70. See id. § 362(a)(2) (applying the automatic stay to "the enforcement, against the
debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the
commencement of the case").
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process to play out, including responding to the dioceses' proposed
plans of reorganization.
D. The Dioceses' Exclusive Right to Propose an Initial Plan of
Reorganization
The debtor's primary offensive leverage in the planning process
lies in its exclusive right to propose a plan.7' During the debtor's
"period of exclusivity," other parties in interest cannot propose
competing plans.72 This "period of exclusivity" is cut off, permitting
other parties in interests to file plans, only if one of three conditions is
met: (1) the court appoints a trustee in the case; (2) the debtor fails
to file a plan within 120 days of the initial bankruptcy petition; or (3)
the debtor files a plan but that plan is not accepted within 180 days of
the initial bankruptcy petition "by each class of claims or interests
that is impaired under the plan. 7 3 Put another way, as long as no
trustee is appointed in the case the debtor has 120 days from the start
of the case to file a plan and 180 days from the start of the case to gain
acceptance of the plan.74 The court may shorten or lengthen-and
frequently does75-either the 120-day or the 180-day time limit "for
cause" if requested to do so by any party in interest.76 For the
dioceses, this means that they have the first opportunity to propose a
plan that will pay their sex-abuse claimant creditors. This puts the
sex-abuse claimants in the defensive position of waiting for the
dioceses to propose a plan and then responding to it, instead of being
71. See id. § 1121(b).
72. See id. (stating that "only the debtor may file a plan until after 120 days after the
[date of filing]") (emphasis added).
73. See id. § 1121(c) (providing that "[a]ny party in interest, including the debtor, the
trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity
security holder, or any indenture trustee, may file a plan if and only if' one of the three
conditions is met) (emphasis added).
74. See id.
75. Courts have found "cause" to extend for a variety of reasons. See, e.g., Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp. (In re Henry Mayo
Newhall Mem'l Hosp.), 282 B.R. 444,452 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) (complexity of case); In re
Cent. Jersey Airport Servs., 282 B.R. 176, 181 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2002) (debtor's probable
success in formulating a plan); In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 88 B.R. 521, 532 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1988) (diligent efforts of debtor).
76. § 1121(d)(1). For cases filed on or after BAPCPA's effective date, October 17,
2005, see supra note 8, the court's ability to extend these periods is limited by the revised
language of § 1121(d), which now limits the extension of the 120-day period and the 180-
day period to not more than eighteen months and not more than twenty months after the
debtor files a Chapter 11 petition, respectively, § 1121(d)(2)(A)-(B). This revision
presumably gives the debtor less flexibility in terms of a timeframe for proposing a plan
and getting it confirmed. Thus, this revision would seem to weigh in favor of sex-abuse
claimants in post-BAPCPA cases.
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able to propose a plan of their own from the start. The debtor's
period of exclusivity is a good example of how the bankruptcy process
permits a formerly reactive party to become a proactive party by
virtue of becoming a debtor under the Code. The dioceses
transitioned from reactive defendants in tort litigation to proactive
debtors while the sex-abuse claimants lost much of the proactive
power normally afforded to plaintiffs in such litigation.
Chapter 11 provides considerable opportunity for the debtor to
control the process of reorganization, but it also provides protection
to creditors. Groups of creditors are represented by committees,
which may be formed by court order.77 The sex-abuse claimants in
both the Portland and the Tucson cases have had committees
appointed to represent their interests.78 As discussed in Part 1I.B,
infra, the sex-abuse claimants may be able to get the dioceses' cases
dismissed if they can show that the dioceses filed in bad faith or that
there is little possibility that the debtor will propose a feasible plan.79
They also have the ability to move for the appointment of a trustee or
an examiner if there is evidence of fraud or that the debtor is not
equipped to manage the reorganization.8"
The sex-abuse claimants, as creditors, are also protected in the
plan process because, if the debtor's period of exclusivity expires,
creditors may propose their own plans.8 Generally speaking, any
plan proposed, whether by debtor or creditors, must treat all creditors
fairly and must pay creditors at least what they would have received
in a Chapter 7 liquidation in order to be confirmed by the court.'
This means that should the dioceses fail to propose a plan before the
expiration of their exclusivity period, creditors, including the sex-
abuse claimants, can propose competing plans. However, these
77. Section 1102(a)(1). Creditor committees are appointed by the United States
trustee, pursuant to court order. Id. The United States trustee is different from the
"trustee" that may be appointed under § 1104. See, e.g., id. § 1105 (providing that the
United States trustee may request termination of the trustee's appointment).
78. See Church Bankruptcy Raises Questions: Whose Assets Are These?, 43 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (LRP) 14, at A3 (Sept. 21, 2004) [hereinafter Church Bankruptcy Questions] (noting
the sex-abuse claimants in Portland are represented by the Official Committee of the
Abuse Plaintiffs); Sheryl Kornman, Parish Property Debate May Extend Bankruptcy Case,
TUCSON CITIZEN, July 9, 2005, at 2A, available at 2005 WLNR 10838363 (noting the tort
claimants committee's role in determining the tiered structure of damages as part of the
Tucson Chapter 11 case).
79. See § 1112(b).
80. Id. § 1104(a).
81. See id. § 1121(c) (providing that creditors may propose if the debtor does not
propose a plan or if the debtor's plan is not accepted within the 180 day period).
82. See id. § 1129(a)-(b). Plan confirmation is discussed in more detail, infra notes
230-36 and accompanying text.
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periods of exclusivity are often extended by the court, as exemplified
by the Portland case where the judge has granted extensions,
stretching to over a year after the diocese filed its petition.83
E. Chapter 11 as an Equitable Process as Illustrated by the
Analogous Mass Torts Bankruptcy Cases
In addition to understanding the roles of debtor and creditor
outlined in Chapter 11 and the respective advantages and protections
the Code gives them, it is important to remember that "[t]he hallmark
of chapter 11 is flexibility."' The DIP is given significant discretion
in operating its business.85 The process of negotiating the plan is
designed to result in the consensual acceptance of a plan under which
the debtor and majority of creditors have agreed as to the amounts of
payment and the general future operations of the business.86 A
successful Chapter 11 process for the dioceses would culminate in the
confirmation of a plan under which they pay the claims of the present
sex-abuse claimants and move forward with even future sex-abuse
claims handled by the process set up by the bankruptcy court.' The
83. Steve Woodward, Church Gains Time in Bankruptcy, OREGONIAN (Portland),
May 25, 2005, at Cll, available at 2005 WLNR 8324517 (noting that the original deadline
for the diocese to file its plan was November 3, 2004, which was extended to June 1, 2005,
which was extended to November 15, 2005).
84. 7 COLLIER, supra note 48, 1100.01.
85. See §§ 363,365.
86. 7 COLLIER, supra note 48, 1100.01. Although the process is designed to result in
consensual confirmation of the plan by all creditors, there is a nonconsensual alternative
called the cramdown method, which is discussed in more detail in Part III.A, infra.
87. See In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 44 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) 54
(Bankr. D. Or. Jan. 10, 2005), where Bankruptcy Judge Elizabeth Perris noted the
Portland archdiocese's own reasons for filing for Chapter 11:
Debtor's representatives and counsel have stated on numerous occasions in this
court, that debtor's purpose in filing a chapter 11 petition was to resolve, fairly,
finally and in a global fashion, the sexual abuse claims asserted against it .... The
appointment of a [Future Claims Representative] to represent the interests of
those persons who know they were subjected to abuse but who have not
discovered the resulting injury or the causal connection between the injury and the
abuse will effectuate debtor's stated goal and will assure equitable treatment of
future as well as present claimants.
Id. at 246 (footnote omitted).
It is true, given their opposing view points, that what is a success for the diocese
will not necessarily be a success for the sex-abuse claimants. As discussed in Part I.B,
supra, one of the primary goals of the process is to give the debtor a "fresh start."
Therefore, success under Chapter 11 often is measured by the relative success of the
debtor's reorganization. However, the Code also provides the creditor protections
discussed in Part I.D, supra.
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treatment of future claimants may be one of the most problematic
issues in the diocesan bankruptcies.
It is in response to the future claimant issue that the bankruptcy
court likely will demonstrate its flexible, equitable jurisdiction. To
some extent, the courts in the dioceses' cases have already looked to a
particular group of analogous cases-the mass torts bankruptcies of
the 1980s through today-to help them address the future claimant
issue. A "mass tort" has been described as "a harmful act or series of
acts by a company, such as the production of a defective product, that
results in injuries to numerous victims-sometimes numbering into
the thousands or hundreds of thousands. ' 8   Starting in the 1980s,
several companies facing mass tort liability sought protection of the
federal bankruptcy laws, as one commentator noted, because of
"[t]he practical inability to provide each tort victim with traditional,
individualized adjudication under the usual rules of litigation" while
still preserving the viability of their businesses.89 The mass torts
bankruptcy cases were first filed by asbestos manufacturers, including
Manville,9" Celotex Corp.,91 Eagle-Picher Industries,92 and Keene
Corp.,93 each of which faced thousands of personal injury claims.
1. Asbestos Bankruptcies: The Future Claimant as Introduced by
In re Johns-Manville Corp.
The concept of a "future claimant" was thoroughly developed in
In re Johns-Manville Corp.94 The Johns-Manville court defined
"future asbestos claimants" as "all persons and entities who, on or
before [the date the Chapter 11 petition was filed], came into contact
with asbestos or asbestos-containing products mined, fabricated,
manufactured, supplied or sold by Manville and who have not yet
filed claims against Manville for personal injuries or property
damage." 95 As to the personal injury claimants, the court noted that
they "may be unaware of their entitlement to recourse against
88. Resnick, supra note 30, at 2045.
89. Id. at 2045-46.
90. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 745 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), affd, 52
B.R. 940 (S.D.N.Y 1985).
91. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Rapid Am. Corp. (In re Celotex Corp.), 124 F.3d 619,
622 (4th Cir. 1997).
92. See In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 197 B.R. 260, 263-64 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996).
93. See In re Keene Corp., 208 B.R. 112, 113 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997).
94. 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
95. Id. at 744-45.
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Manville due to the latency period of many years characterizing
manifestation of all asbestos related diseases."96
The Johns-Manville court ultimately approved the appointment
of a legal representative for these future claimants.97 In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted that the broad language of § 1109(b) of
the Code "ma[de] clear that any 'party in interest' may appear and be
heard in a Chapter 11 case." 98 Because of the elasticity of the term
"party in interest," the court concluded that "[f]uture claimants are
undeniably parties in interest to these reorganization proceedings."99
The Johns-Manville court emphasized the important role the future
claimants played in the bankruptcy when it stated:
[F]uture claimants are indeed the central focus of the entire
reorganization. Any plan not dealing with their interests
precludes a meaningful and effective reorganization .... Any
meaningful plan will either provide funding for future claimants
directly or provide for the continuation of some form of
responsive, ongoing entity post-confirmation, from which to
glean assets with which to pay them."'
In addition to finding that the future asbestos claimants fit within
the broad definition of "parties in interest" under § 1109(b), the
Johns-Manville court also supported its appointment of a future
claimant representative with case law holding that "mere exposure to
asbestos triggers insurance coverage."'01 Insurance coverage was
relevant because one of the major issues in the litigation surrounding
the Manville bankruptcy concerned the "appropriate trigger" for
insurance companies to pay out under Manville's liability insurance
policies." The court reasoned that "if exposure triggers a sufficient
96. Id. at 745.
97. Id. at 759.
98. Id. at 747. The Code in pertinent part states: "a party in interest, including the
debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a
creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear
and be heard on any issue in a case under [Chapter 11]." 11 U.S.C.A. § 1109(b) (Supp. V
2005). The Johns-Manville court found that the listing of parties in interest in § 1109(b)
was illustrative and "not meant to exclude other types of interested parties from the
purview of that section." 36 B.R. at 747-48.
99. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. at 749.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Porter v. Am. Optical Co., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980)).
102. See id. at 750. The court further explained that Manville's approximately twenty-
five insurance companies, which underwrote approximately 100 policies, "have by and
large refused to provide defense and indemnity to Manville in asbestos cases. Manville
20051
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interest on the part of future claimants to warrant insurance coverage,
then this same exposure should a fortiori justify a declaration that
they are parties in interest to be impacted by these proceedings."13
A third basis on which the Johns-Manville court based its
appointment of a future claimants' representative was the equitable
powers of the bankruptcy court.1°4 Specifically, the court cited the
"pervasive equitable powers" given to bankruptcy courts under
§ 105(a) of the Code." Section 105(a) states:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.
No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by
a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from,
sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination
necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders
or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.1°6
The Johns-Manville court explained that its equitable powers under
§ 105(a) "specifically ... enable[d] it to respond to extraordinary
problems" presented in Chapter 11 cases as long as its response was
consistent with the chapter's statutory goals. °7
The court further determined that it was consistent with
equitable principles to respond to the "extraordinary problem" of
future claimants by appointing a legal representative who would
represent them during the remainder of the Manville
reorganization.08 The court supported this final determination by
citing analogous appointments made in earlier cases of a trustee to
represent the interests of unborn descendants in a quiet title action"°
and a special committee to represent present and future tort
asserts that its inability to look to at least $600 million in insurance coverage is a major
factor in its decision to seek Chapter 11 relief." Id. (citation omitted).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 757.
105. Id. The court also cited 28 U.S.C. § 1481 as supporting its broad equitable powers.
Id. However, § 1481 was rendered "ineffective" by the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ("BAFJA"). See Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 113, 98 Stat. 333,
343 (1984); see also John T. Strasburger, The ABC's of Admiralty and Bankruptcy in
Concert or Conflict, 21 J. MAR. L. & COM. 273, 275 & n.7 (1990) (describing the
uncertainty over whether § 1481 was rendered ineffective, omitted, or repealed by
BAFJA).
106. 11 U.S.C.A. § 105(a) (Supp. V 2005).
107. In reJohns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. at 757.
108. Id. at 758.
109. Id. (citing Gunnell v. Palmer, 18 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Ill. 1938)).
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claimants in a railroad receivership case." 0 In its appointment of a
future claimants' representative, the Johns-Manville court set an
important precedent for other mass torts cases. Other courts have
followed Johns-Manville in asbestos-related bankruptcy cases by
appointing representatives for claimants who had been injured by
asbestos though the injury had not yet manifested itself.11' Further,
the Code now expressly authorizes the court to appoint future claims
representatives in asbestos bankruptcy cases.1 2
2. Other Mass Torts Bankruptcies and Different Treatment of Future
Claims
Asbestos is not the only product leading to bankruptcy in the
mass torts context. A.H. Robins, the manufacturer of the Dalkon
Shield intrauterine device filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy at a time
when it had already settled 9,238 claims for approximately $530
million and still had approximately 5,000 suits pending against it.13
Similarly, Dow Corning, a manufacturer of silicone breast implants,
faced approximately 440,000 potential claimants, including
approximately 19,000 individual actions and forty-five possible class
actions, at the time it filed for Chapter 11.11
Similar to the Manville reorganization, the A.H. Robins
reorganization utilized a special representative for future claimants. 1 5
In contrast, Dow Corning's bankruptcy judge opted not to appoint a
future claimants' representative.'16 The Dow Coming court reasoned
that because Dow Corning knew who had received its implants, it also
knew, at the time it filed for bankruptcy, the total group of potential
claimants that might be injured by its product and file suit."7 Thus,
the court concluded that "[a]ll who have received a breast implant are
cognizable of this fact.""' 8 The court noted, by contrast, claims arising
110. Id. (citing F.C. Underhay, Torts Claims in Receivership and Reorganization, 22
IOWA L. REV. 60,77-80 (1936)).
111. See, e.g., In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1035 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that a
future claims representative should be appointed); In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 58
B.R. 476, 476 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (same); In re UNR Indus., 46 B.R. 671, 676 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1985) (same).
112. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(g)(4)(B)(iii) (Supp. V 2005).
113. In re A.H. Robins Co., 89 B.R. 555,557 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).
114. In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 552-53 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997).
115. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 699 (4th Cir. 1989) (describing A.H.
Robins' reorganization plan, specifically noting the Future Claimant's Representative's
participation in the claims estimation procedure).
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from the asbestos-related injuries were unknowable in number and
duration.119 The Dow Coming court's conclusion demonstrates that
although the bankruptcy court has broad equitable jurisdiction to
handle special issues like future claims, the court must determine if
the specifics of the case before it require a particular equitable
remedy. Put another way, although the appointment of a future
claims representative may be equitable in one mass tort case, it may
not be in another.
3. The Relevance of the Mass Torts Bankruptcies to the Diocesan
Bankruptcies
To some extent the judges in both Portland and Tucson have
followed the Johns-Manville mass torts model and decided that equity
requires the appointment of a future claims representative for
claimants who have not yet filed claims.12° In the Portland case, the
bankruptcy court expressly noted that the appointment of a
representative for future claims in its case was consistent with that
taken in In re Johns-Manville Corp.2' Particularly important to the
Portland court was the similarity of a long latency period between the
occurrence of abuse-like exposure to asbestos-and manifestation
of injury resulting from that abuse. 22 The court noted that "[t]he
evidence in this case is that, when childhood sexual abuse causes an
injury, the injury may not be manifest for many years. "123
While the Portland court noted similarities between its case and
Johns-Manville, it distinguished its case from In re Dow Coming
Corp.124  In the Portland case, the debtor archdiocese cited Dow
Corning to support its argument that such a representative "[was] not
necessary to represent the interests of those potential claimants who
know they have been subjected to abuse, but have not yet manifested
an injury."'' 25  In rejecting this argument and distinguishing Dow
Corning, the Portland court noted first that injuries resulting from
childhood sexual abuse were more cognitive and psychological in
nature, possibly preventing an injured person from recognizing the
119. See id.; In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743,757 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
120. In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 44 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) 54, at
244 (Bankr. D. Or. Jan. 10, 2005) (explaining the appointment of the future claims
representative in the Portland case, while noting the same type of appointment in the
Tucson case).
121. Id. at 245 (citing In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
122. Id.
123. Id. (citation omitted).
124. Id. at 245-46.
125. Id. at 245.
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injury itself or identifying the causal connection between an injury
and the abuse.126 The court observed that the injuries at issue in Dow
Corning-those resulting from exposure to silicone breast implants-
were simply "not of this type.'1 27 Second, the Portland court noted
that the committee representing present claimants in the Portland
case, the Tort Claimants Committee, "[did] not take the position that
all those exposed to childhood sexual abuse have been damaged in a
legal sense, or purport to represent the interests of such persons. "128
The Portland court contrasted this position with that taken by an
analogous committee in Dow Coming, which posited that anyone
who had received a breast implant had already suffered an injury and
thus all claimants were present claimants. 129  The Portland court
concluded that, given the nature of the abuse and the possibility of a
latency period between the abuse and manifestation of injury,
appointment of a future claims representative was appropriate. 3 °
Although the Portland court looked to mass torts cases to
determine if appointment of a future claims representative was
appropriate, it looked to another source of law to determine the
scope of this representation: state law.13' Noting that federal law-
specifically § 101(5) of the Code-determines when a bankruptcy
claim arises, the court pointed out that it is state law that determines
if any claim exists in the first place.132 The court noted that under the
126. Id. at 245-46.
127. Id. at 246.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 598 n.55 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1997)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 245 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117(1) (1997)).
132. Id. at 244 (citing In re Hassanally, 208 B.R. 46, 50 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997)); see also
11 U.S.C.A. § 101(10) (Supp. V 2005) (defining claim as "right to payment, whether or not
such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured"). The Oregon
Revised Statutes define the scope of the relevant child abuse claim:
[A]n action based on conduct that constitutes child abuse or conduct knowingly
allowing, permitting or encouraging child abuse accruing while the person who is
entitled to bring the action is under 18 years of age shall be commenced not more
than six years after that person attains 18 years of age, or if the injured person has
not discovered the injury or the causal connection between the injury and the child
abuse, nor in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered the injury or
the causal connection between the injury and the child abuse, not more than three
years from the date the injured person discovers or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have discovered the injury or the causal connection between the child
abuse and the injury, whichever period is longer.
OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117(1).
2005]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
relevant Oregon statute victims of childhood sexual abuse were given
an extended period of time to assert claims-up to three years after a
person exercising reasonable care discovers the abuse or the causal
connection between abuse and injuryt33-thus recognizing the
possibility of a long latency period between abuse and manifestation
of injury. 34 Further, the court noted that Oregon case law recognized
that such a latency period could last for decades.135 Based on the
statute and case law, the Portland court concluded that the future
claims representative would represent the following parties:
(1) minors; (2) those with repressed memory; and (3) those
persons who know they were subjected to sexual contact as
children but who have "not discovered the [resulting] injury or
the causal connection between the injury and the child abuse,
nor in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered
the injury or the causal connection between the injury and the
child abuse.'
1 36
The Portland court pointed out that this scope of representation
excluded claimants who knew of their abuse and injury but simply
declined to come forward out of embarrassment, shame, or other
reluctance.137 By contrast, the court noted, the Tucson court had not
placed any such restriction on its future claims representative. 38
Thus, the Portland court's use of the equitable jurisdiction
afforded by the Code, as supported by precedent from analogous and
distinguishable mass torts bankruptcy cases, and its use of state
statutory and case law to craft a future claims representative
appropriate for the Archdiocese of Portland's Chapter 11 case
demonstrates the ultimate flexibility of the bankruptcy process. The
advantage of this flexibility is that the court has wide discretion to
craft solutions for the unique problems presented by the particular
case before it. In the Portland case, this solution resulted in the
appointment of a future claims representative specifically tailored for
that case.
Provided the diocesan bankruptcy courts continue to recognize
the future sex-abuse claimants as at least partly analogous to other
133. OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117(1).
134. See In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 44 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) at
246 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117(1)).
135. Id. (citing P.H. v. F.C., 873 P.2d 465 (Or. App. 1994)).
136. Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117(1)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 245.
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mass torts future claimants, the courts may fashion other remedies
after those provided in the mass torts bankruptcies, such as formation
of a trust to fund future claims.'39 This has already been done in some
fashion in the Tucson case where the confirmed plan established a
trust fund to pay future claims.14 The Code provides a trust
mechanism in § 524(g), but this mechanism is rather complex and
only applies to asbestos-related injury cases.141 However, again, a
bankruptcy court could use its general power under § 105(a) to "issue
any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this title"142-as illustrated in the Tucson
case. In addition to the trust, which handles the funding aspect, if the
diocesan cases follow the mass torts cases, there likely will be a claims
processing mechanism to determine the merits of future claims. 43
It is difficult at this point to gauge how closely the bankruptcy
courts handling the diocesan bankruptcies will follow the mass torts
cases as models, but it certainly appears that the mass torts
bankruptcies have been useful to some extent and should be useful
going forward in the Portland and Spokane cases and any other
Catholic diocese cases that may result from the sex-abuse scandal.
However, the utility of the mass torts cases as models for the diocesan
bankruptcies also includes learning from their mistakes. For
example, despite efforts to provide adequate representation for
future claimants, the process set up for payment of future claims in
the Manville asbestos case ultimately resulted in future claimants
being paid far less than expected-largely because the number of
claims greatly exceeded expectations.'" Again, it seems too early in
the diocesan bankruptcy history to delve too deeply into the full
extent of the analogy between these cases and the mass torts
bankruptcies. However, there are some obvious parallels, as noted in
this Part, and it seems likely that the bankruptcy courts handling the
cases will look to the mass torts cases for guidance-both as to what
will work and what probably will not work. 45
139. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(g)(2)(B) (Supp. V 2005).
140. Kornman, supra note 18.
141. § 524(g)(2)(B) (setting out the requirements of the trust, including to pay asbestos
related personal and property injuries).
142. Id. § 105(a).
143. Id. § 1141 (permitting the court to discharge the debtor for debts handled by the
plan process).
144. See Yair Listokin & Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort
Bankruptcies, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1435, 1444-51 (2004) (giving an overview of the Manville
bankruptcy and its shortcomings regarding the representation of future claims).
145. Again, normative concerns are beyond the scope of this Comment. There
certainly are some to note-especially in the mass torts bankruptcy context. For further,
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II. THE GOOD FAITH TEST AS A TOOL FOR THE SEX-ABUSE
CLAIMANTS AND AN OBSTACLE FOR THE DIOCESES
A. Comparing Two Approaches to the Good Faith Test: In re Johns-
Manville Corp. and In re SGL Carbon Corp.
Long before successful emergence from bankruptcy, the dioceses
face the possible challenge of a claimant's motion to dismiss its case
for "cause.' 14 6 A court can hear any such motion filed by a "party in
interest." '147 In the diocesan bankruptcy cases, sex-abuse claimants
could file this motion alleging that the diocese debtor did not file in
"good faith."' 48 If the sex-abuse claimants were to prevail, it would
take the dispute out of the bankruptcy court and return it to
nonbankruptcy civil litigation.
The Code does not explicitly list lack of good faith as grounds for
dismissal of a debtor's case, but many courts have held that there is at
least an implied good faith requirement for filing.'49 What the "good
faith" requirement entails depends on the court deciding the case.
Two cases, illustrating different approaches to the requirement, are
helpful in understanding how the good faith requirement might be
applied in the diocesan bankruptcy cases. The first case, In re Johns-
thoughtful analysis on the normative question of whether bankruptcy is the appropriate
"vehicle" for resolving the problems unique to mass torts cases, see generally Resnick,
supra note 30 (arguing that bankruptcy is an appropriate framework for dealing with mass
tort liability); S. Elizabeth Gibson, A Response to Professor Resnick: Will this Vehicle Pass
Inspection?, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2095 (2000) (noting advantages of using bankruptcy to
address mass tort liability but also discussing concerns about the same).
146. § 1112(b)(1).
147. See id.
148. Though this tool has not been used by the sex-abuse claimants in the Portland,
Tucson, or Spokane cases, it does not mean that it is not a viable option. However, the
fact that it has not been used may point to all parties' desire to resolve the sex-abuse crisis,
even in a forum like the bankruptcy court where the dioceses are the focus of attention.
149. See id. § 1112(b)(4)(A)-(P) (listing sixteen situations that might constitute "cause"
but not including "lack of good faith"). But see In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154,
160-61 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
"have held that the absence of good faith constitutes 'cause' to dismiss a Chapter 11
petition"); id. at 161 (noting that the First, Second, and Fourth Circuits "have concluded
that Chapter 11 imposes a general good faith requirement under which petitions can be
dismissed for bad faith"). The cases cited in this note, which found good faith relevant to
dismissal under § 1112 of the Code, were applying a section that was revised by BAPCPA.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1)-(10) (2000) (amended 2005); see also supra note 8 (noting the
enactment of BAPCPA and its effective date of October 17, 2005). Section 1112(b) listed
ten situations, instead of sixteen, that could constitute "cause." See § 1112(b). However,
"good faith" was not included in the earlier version of § 1112, either.
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Manville Corp.,"' involved an asbestos manufacturer, Manville, which
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the wake of approximately 16,000
asbestos-related injury civil suits pending against it.' Manville
admitted that the lawsuits were the sole factor necessitating its
Chapter 11 filing. 52  At issue in the case was the propriety of
Manville's filing for bankruptcy. 53  The Committee of Asbestos-
Related Litigants and/or Creditors, as well as three of Manville's co-
defendants filed motions to dismiss the Chapter 11 case under
§ 1112(b), requesting dismissal "for cause"-specifically for lack of
good faith.'54
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
denied the motion to dismiss Manville's case.155 The court found that
the good faith test was not a hard and fast requirement but, rather,
was to be applied considering the totality of the circumstances in each
case. 56 The court emphasized that "the essential fact" of the case was
that "as of [its filing date] Manville [was] a real company with real
debt, real creditors and a compelling need to reorganize in order to
meet [those] obligations."'57 Further, the court noted that the Code
did not require the debtor to be insolvent in order to file a voluntary
bankruptcy petition. 158 In fact, the court noted that debtors facing
challenges such as Manville should be encouraged to seek the
solutions offered by the bankruptcy court before their situations
became more critical.15
9
150. 36 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). Note that this case is different from In re
Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), which dealt with appointment
of a future claims representative and was discussed in Part I.E, supra. The Johns-Manville
case discussed in this Part deals only with the good faith test. However, both cases were
part of the Manville bankruptcy reorganization.




155. Id. at 743.
156. See id. at 733 (noting that "for cause" under § 1112(b) is determined using the
wide discretion of the court on a case-by-case consideration of the specific circumstances
involved).
157. Id. at 730.
158. Id. at 731-32. The court noted that the only point at which the Code required
insolvency for voluntary petitioners was in § 109(c)(3), which requires that municipality
debtors be insolvent. Id.
159. See id. at 736. The court found that the legislative history behind the Code
suggests that bankruptcy should not be thought of as a last resort for financially troubled
debtors but as an encouraged resort. Id. It noted that this encouraged resort to
bankruptcy "not only comports with the elimination of an insolvency requirement, but
also is a corollary of the key aim of Chapter 11 of the Code, that of avoidance of
liquidation." Id.
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Another important distinction the Johns-Manville court made
was that the determination of the propriety of filing and the
determination of the propriety of plan confirmation are separate and
distinct."6  It pointed out that good faith is only an express
requirement for plan confirmation and not necessarily for filing a
petition, stating:
In determining whether to dismiss under [§] 1112(b), a court is
not necessarily required to consider whether the debtor has
filed in "good faith" because that is not a specified predicate
under the Code for filing. Rather, according to [§] 1129(a)(3),
good faith emerges as a requirement for the confirmation of a
plan.161
In applying its flexible good faith standard to the facts of the
Manville bankruptcy case, the court concluded that the case should
not be dismissed, finding "that these petitions were filed only after
[the debtor] undertook lengthy, careful and detailed analysis" and
that there was a "slow and deliberate process of data commissioning
and review and 'soul-searching' antedating the filing."' 62 The court
also pointed out the practical effect of dismissal in this case: no one
would benefit except those that won "the race to the courthouse.'
'1 63
The court reminded the tort claimants and the other parties who had
moved to dismiss the filing that because a "Chapter 11 filing creates a
bankruptcy estate ... for the benefit not simply of the debtor, but
rather also for the benefit of all of the debtor's creditors and equity
holders[,] ... the intense focus on the debtor's motives in filing is
misplaced."'" 6 Ultimately, the Johns-Manville court favored a flexible
approach to the good faith filing inquiry, declaring its "belief that
there is no strict and absolute 'good faith' predicate to filing a
Chapter 11 petition., 165 In the court's view, the issue of good faith in
the filing context had more to do with the bankruptcy court's
jurisdictional integrity than the debtor's integrity.166 The proper
160. Id. at 734 ("The essential determination here is the propriety of the filing, and
whether 'cause' exists to vitiate it, not the confirmability of a particular plan. If Manville is
unable to effectuate a particular plan, that is not tantamount to finding that no plan can be
effectuated.").
161. Id. at 735.
162. Id. at 734.
163. Id. at 740.
164. Id. at 737.
165. See id. at 737-38.
166. Id. at 737.
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inquiry under this view was whether the debtor, by filing, was abusing
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.167
However, there have been cases in which the debtor's case was
dismissed for lack of good faith. In one such case, In re SGL Carbon
Corp. 168 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit purported to take
a broader view than the Johns-Manville court as to what constitutes a
lack of good faith in the Chapter 11 filing context. 16 9 From the outset
of the case, the court framed the issue as whether it would adopt a
good faith requirement for Chapter 11 filings.170 After answering this
question in the affirmative, the Third Circuit described the good faith
test as a "fact intensive analysis." '' The debtor in this case, SGL
Carbon, was a company that, after the United States Department of
Justice started investigating it for price-fixing, was named as a
defendant in numerous civil class action antitrust suits.'72 Citing its
estimated $240 million in liabilities from the criminal and civil
penalties, SGL Carbon filed a Chapter 11 petition.'73
Along with its petition, SGL Carbon proposed a reorganization
plan under which only the civil antitrust suit claimant creditors would
receive less than full payment of debt. 174 At the same time that the
company announced its filing, the company's chairman was describing
the company as financially healthy to security analysts and
emphasizing its Chapter 11 petition as "innovative" and "creative."' 75
Further, the court noted, the company's vice president testified in his
167. Id. Although the court rejected a "strict and absolute requirement," it did note
examples of bankruptcy filings that would undermine the jurisdictional integrity of the
court, including
where a reorganized debtor never operated legitimately or was formed for the sole
purpose of filing[,] ... where there has been a change in legal form prior to the
filing from an ineligible entity to one able to file under this Chapter in order to
avoid a foreclosure sale[,] ... where the debtor filed to forestall tax liability
without any need for reorganization of debt.
Id. at 738.
168. 200 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1999).
169. See id. at 168 (noting the Johns-Manville court had a narrow view as to what
constitutes a lack of good faith).
170. Id. at 156.
171. Id. The Third Circuit's conception of the test as "fact intensive" raises some
questions as to whether its approach was really that different from the Johns-Manville
court's approach, which described its own "concept of good faith [as] an elastic one which
can be read into the statute on a limited ad hoc basis." In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36
B.R. at 737 (citation omitted).
172. In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d at 156-57.
173. Id. at 157.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 158.
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deposition that he believed filing Chapter 11 would change its
bargaining position with plaintiffs in the civil antitrust suits by putting
pressure on them to settle.'76 These facts did not reflect well on SGL
Carbon's good faith in the eyes of the Third Circuit.
Declaring that "Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions are subject to
dismissal under ... § 1112(b) unless filed in good faith,"'77 the court
engaged in the "requisite fact intensive inquiry [which] requires
determining where [the debtor's] petition falls along the spectrum
ranging from the clearly acceptable to the patently abusive."'78 The
court also looked at whether SGL Carbon's petition "serv[ed] a valid
reorganizational purpose."'79 SGL Carbon cited the Johns-Manville
case180 in arguing that the good faith standard was a flexible one.'8
The Third Circuit rejected this argument largely by distinguishing
Johns-Manville on its facts. 82 The court pointed out that Manville, at
the time of its filing, was facing significantly greater financial
difficulties and that it already had many judgments entered against it
and many more still pending.'83 Also important to the court's analysis
was the distinguishable nature of the lawsuits against Manville." 4 The
SGL Carbon court noted that Manville, at the time of its case, faced
suits of an unknown number for the next twenty to thirty years while
SGL Carbon "face[d] a known and finite number of suits."'85 One
similarity the Third Circuit noted between the two cases was the
Johns-Manville court's perception that the Manville tort claimants
were using the motion to dismiss for tactical purposes and its own
perception that SGL Carbon was using the bankruptcy process to
gain a tactical advantage over the plaintiffs in civil suits against it.'86
176. Id.
177. Id. at 160. The court noted that the list of situations constituting "cause" in
§ 1112(b)(l)-(10) is not exhaustive. Id. After BAPCPA, see supra note 8, the list of
situations that might constitute "cause" for dismissal now includes sixteen situations, but
the language introducing the list is similar to that introducing the list analyzed by the SGL
Carbon court, thus it seems likely that courts will continue to construe it as not exhaustive.
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1112(b)(4) (Supp. V 2005) (providing that for the purposes of
subsection 1112(b), "the term 'cause' includes" the sixteen situations listed).
178. In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d at 162.
179. Id. at 165.
180. 36 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
181. See In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d at 164.
182. See id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 169.
185. Id.
186. See id. ("In denying the creditors' motion to dismiss, the fJohns-Manville] court
stated it would 'bear in mind the strategical motivations underlying [creditors'] pursuit of
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All of these findings led the Third Circuit to conclude that SGL
Carbon's filing "lack[ed] a valid reorganizational purpose and
consequently lack[ed] good faith making it subject to dismissal 'for
cause' under ... § 1112(b)." '187 The court observed that while "the
Bankruptcy Code presents an inviting safe harbor[,] ... this lure
creates the possibility of abuse which must be guarded against to
protect the integrity of the bankruptcy system.' 1 88
So, like the Johns-Manville court, the SGL Carbon court was
concerned with the integrity of the bankruptcy process. The latter
court may have been more willing to read a good faith requirement
into the language of § 1112(b), but the former court used the good
faith inquiry with a similar objective in mind: to prohibit debtors
from abusing the Chapter 11 process.
B. Applying the Good Faith Test to the Diocesan Bankruptcies
At some point the good faith inquiry may be at issue in the
Portland, Spokane, or any other Chapter 11 diocesan bankruptcies189
stemming from the sex-abuse scandal. The Portland and Spokane
cases are in the Ninth Circuit, which, like the Third Circuit in SGL
Carbon, has held that lack of good faith in filing constitutes "cause"
for dismissal under § 1112(b). 9° This suggests that a court reviewing
these motions at this time' ....") (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Johns-
Manville, 36 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. As noted previously, supra note 8, the Portland, Tucson, and Spokane cases fall
under the version of the Code that was in force at the time the Johns-Manville and SGL
Carbon cases were decided, because they were filed before October 17, 2005, the effective
date of BAPCPA, which revised the Bankruptcy Code. For any cases filed after October
17, 2005, the revisions of § 1112(b) apply. One revision that may make it harder for a
party in interest to get a Chapter 11 debtor's case dismissed is the revised language of
§ 1112(b). It says that dismissal "shall not be granted absent unusual circumstances ... if
the debtor or another party in interest objects and establishes that": (1) it is reasonably
likely that a plan will be confirmed in the timeframe prescribed by the Code; and (2) the
grounds for dismissal include an act or omission by the debtor for which there is a
reasonable justification and that can be cured within a reasonable time prescribed by the
court. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1112(b)(2) (Supp. V 2005). This language, which seems to permit an
added defense for the debtor, was not present in the pre-BAPCPA version of § 1112. See
11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2000) (amended 2005). Thus, the BAPCPA revisions seem to
provide an advantage for debtors who can establish this defense. However, the revisions
also contain a longer list of situations that constitute "cause," see 11 U.S.C.A. § 1112(b)(4)
(Supp. V 2005), which might make it easier for a party moving for dismissal to prevail.
Note that "good faith" is listed in neither version, see supra note 149, so it appears that
case law like Johns-Manville and SGL Carbon, which read the "good faith" inquiry into
§ 1112, will remain relevant even to cases filed after October 17, 2005.
190. See Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994).
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those two lines of precedent would follow more closely the SGL
Carbon approach than it would follow the Johns-Manville
approach. 191 Even though there are differences in the approaches
taken in Johns-Manville and SGL Carbon, a good faith inquiry under
either would be fact intensive."l Any court likely will give due weight
to the specifics of each case, including the financial status of the
diocese in question, the number and dollar amount of claims pending
against the diocese, the nature of the claims, and any corporate
reorganization or shifting of assets that predated the filing. Applying
these factors briefly to the diocesan bankruptcies currently pending
gives a sense of the relative strengths and weaknesses of an argument
supporting a motion to dismiss a diocesan bankruptcy petition for
lack of good faith.
First, the financial status of the debtors would be more heavily
scrutinized if a court took an SGL Carbon approach, and such a court
would take note of the fact that neither the Portland nor Spokane
diocese had much debt other than the potential debt that will result
from settling the sex-abuse claims. 193 But lack of insolvency will not
be enough to render financial status fatal. 94 The amount of the
potential debt and its impact on the future operations of the diocese
will weigh in favor of a court concluding that the dioceses face real
financial difficulty. A court would likely conclude that the
bankruptcy filing serves "a valid reorganizational purpose," and thus,
the continued operation of the debtor as a result of the financial
reorganization is worth the hardship the debtor's creditors face
191. As discussed supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text, the Johns-Manville court
refused to find good faith as a hard and fast requirement. By contrast, the SGL Carbon
court found lack of good faith could constitute "cause" for dismissal under § 1112(b). See
supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
192. The Johns-Manville court noted that bankruptcy courts have wide discretion to
choose, on a case-by-case consideration of the specific circumstances involved, whether to
imply a good faith requirement in the "for cause" determination under § 1112(b). See In
re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 733 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). Similarly, the SGL
Carbon court described the good faith test as a "fact intensive analysis." 200 F.3d at 156.
193. The SGL Carbon court did seem to place more weight on the debtor's financial
status than did the Johns-Manville court, which went out of its way to assert that solvency
was not dispositive to the good faith analysis. Compare In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36
B.R. at 732-33 (stating that insolvency is not required for a Chapter 11 filing), with In re
SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d at 164 (noting debtor's lack of financial troubles other than
the antitrust lawsuits pending against it).
194. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(b), (d) (Supp. V 2005) (containing no insolvency
requirement for voluntary debtors under Chapter 11).
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because the debtor filed for bankruptcy.1 95 However, depending on
the facts before it, a court could find that the dioceses' "aims lie
outside those of the Bankruptcy Code" if it finds the dioceses moved
the cases to bankruptcy court merely as a way to gain a tactical
advantage in unsuccessful negotiations with sex-abuse claimants. 96
Second, the number of claims is a weak spot in the good faith
analysis for the dioceses. In the Spokane case, the diocese filed after
failing to reach settlements in twenty-eight pending claims with thirty
claims yet to be litigated. 197 At the time of its filing, the Portland
archdiocese had spent more than $53 million in settling 130 claims
with sixty suits remaining unsettled. 98 The claims are fewer in
number than those in the Johns-Manville case, which had
approximately 16,000 claims pending at filing 99 and smaller in dollar
amount than those in the SGL Carbon case, involving around $240
million. 2°° Given that a number of dioceses have successfully settled
claims outside the bankruptcy process, a court could also question
why these dioceses need the bankruptcy process to settle their
claims.20 ' Failure to reach settlements as other dioceses have could
cause a court to question whether the bankruptcy petitions in
195. The SGL Carbon court specifically found that SGL Carbon's petition should be
dismissed because it lacked this "valid reorganizational purpose." 200 F.3d at 169. The
court explained the necessity of the requirement of a "reorganizational purpose":
Chapter 11 vests [the debtor] with considerable powers-the automatic stay, the
exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan, the discharge of debts, etc.-that
can impose significant hardship on particular creditors. When financially troubled
debtors seek a chance to remain in business, the exercise of those powers is
justified. But this is not so when a petitioner's aims lie outside those of the
Bankruptcy Code.
Id. at 165-66.
196. See id. at 166; see also infra note 202 and accompanying text (noting that SGL
Carbon's use of bankruptcy to gain tactical advantage factored into the Third Circuit's
decision to dismiss the case for lack of good faith).
197. Spokane Diocese Files Chapter 11, 43 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) 25, at 7 (Dec. 21,
2004) [hereinafter Spokane Diocese Files].
198. Green & Woodward, supra note 8.
199. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 729 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1984).
200. See In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d at 157.
201. See Cathy Lynn Grossman, Biggest Clergy Abuse Settlement Announced, USA
TODAY, Jan. 5, 2005, at 3A (listing the top ten dioceses in settlement costs, including
Boston at $120.6 million; Orange, California, at $104.7 million; Portland at $53 million;
Dallas at $47.7 million; Chicago at $38.8 million; Bridgeport, Connecticut, at $37.7 million;
Santa Fe at $31.1 million; Louisville at $29 million; Lafayette, Louisiana, at $26 million;
and Manchester, New Hampshire, at $20.3 million). The Portland archdiocese's inclusion
on this list would probably make the issue of other dioceses settling outside of bankruptcy
less relevant to its bankruptcy petition since it has already settled some claims outside of
bankruptcy.
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Portland and Spokane were filed simply to gain tactical advantage
over the sex-abuse claimants.2 °2 The filing of the Chapter 11 petition
stayed all pending law suits against the dioceses.2 3 If the dioceses can
move successfully through the bankruptcy process, sex-abuse
claimants will effectively be forced to settle, since any confirmed plan
will be the only way through which their claims can be paid.2"
However, the fact that the Tucson diocese was able to emerge from
Chapter 11 by successfully negotiating and having its plan
confirmed 205 may make it easier for Portland and Spokane to justify
their motives for filing. Both could point to the Tucson case as
supporting bankruptcy as a legitimate method of dispute resolution-
rather than a vehicle for limiting liability.
Third, the nature of the claims against the dioceses weighs in
favor of them in the good faith analysis in that sex-abuse claims are
factually similar to the claims in Johns-Manville. Like the asbestos
injury claims, a certain number of the claims will be unknowable at
the time each diocese goes through bankruptcy, because some victims
are not yet aware of their injuries even though the abuse happened
pre-petition. 6 If each diocese continues to pay out claims outside of
bankruptcy, then there is a chance that in the future their ability to
pay will diminish, making them effectively judgment-proof for
claimants filing later in time. The Archbishop of Portland, in
announcing the filing of his archdiocese's Chapter 11 petition, stated
that "the pot of gold is pretty much empty. '27 Although it can be
argued that imposing a solution on future claimants-who do not
even know that they are injured yet-is not in good faith, the diocese
can make the argument that if they do not seek bankruptcy
protection they risk a less desirable solution for future claimants.
202. SGL Carbon's case was dismissed because, among other things, the court found it
was using the bankruptcy process to gain a tactical advantage over plaintiffs who had filed
antitrust suits against it. See In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d at 169.
203. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(1) (Supp. V 2005).
204. See id. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (stating that confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 11 plan
"discharges the debtor of any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation" unless
provided for otherwise in the plan).
205. See Kornman, supra note 18.
206. As Judge Perris, who is presiding over the Portland bankruptcy, notes, "[t]he
possibility of a long latency period before which injury becomes manifest is an important
factual similarity between this case and the asbestos cases." In re Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Portland, 44 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) 54, at 245 (Bankr. D. Or. Jan. 10,
2005). Judge Perris further explained that "the very nature of the tortious conduct alleged
in this case can result in cognitive and psychological injuries, making the injured person
incapable of recognizing that he or she has been injured or of identifying the causal
connection between the abuse and the injury." Id. at 245-46.
207. Green & Woodward, supra note 8.
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Because of this complicated aspect of the claims, a court would not be
likely to find that the diocese filed bankruptcy to dodge the claims,
because the cases are already addressing future claims.2 °8
Fourth, there have been no reports of significant pre-petition
corporate restructuring in any of the dioceses, but this would not
necessarily weigh in the dioceses' favor. Though the Portland and
Spokane dioceses have not changed their corporate structures per
se, 20 9 they have constructed legal arguments attempting to make
certain assets to which they technically hold legal title untouchable.
For example, the Spokane diocese argued that eighty-one churches,
sixteen schools, one high school, and seventy-nine other properties
should not be included it its bankruptcy estate because those assets
belonged to the parishes. 20 However, this position contradicts the
position taken by dioceses like the Archdiocese of Boston, which,
outside the bankruptcy context, have asserted their rights to sell
parish assets to pay out settlement claims to sex-abuse victims.2 1  The
Archdiocese of Boston argues this position because it, like the
Spokane diocese, controls many aspects of parish operations. 12 Sex-
abuse claimants could raise the argument that the dioceses are
engaging in constructive corporate restructuring and, in doing so, are
shielding assets they could not protect outside the bankruptcy
context. Again, if the sex-abuse claimants were to prevail on this
shielding assets argument it would further support their contentions
that the dioceses' aims lie outside the Code and, by extension, lack a
reorganizational purpose. Further, the sex-abuse claimants could
argue that using the bankruptcy process to shield assets "patently
abus[es] ''213 the court's jurisdiction.
The good faith determination ultimately depends so heavily on
the facts of the case and the discretion of the presiding judge that
prevailing on a motion to dismiss would be difficult for the sex-abuse
claimants notwithstanding strong arguments in support thereof. The
208. See In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 44 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) at
245-46 (explaining the Portland bankruptcy judge's reasons for appointing a future claims
representative and noting that the same has been done in the Tucson case).
209. There are other dioceses undergoing what can be arguably labeled corporate
restructuring. There were reports of $30 million being transferred within the diocese of
San Diego, California. Guccione, supra note 25. Also reported were the formation of new
corporations within the Diocese of Orange County, California, and the separate
incorporation of each parish in Baker, Oregon. Id.
210. See Nicholas K. Geranios, Spokane Diocese Says Victims Can't Seek Parish Assets,
SEATTLE TIMES, May 28,2005, at B2, available at 2005 WLNR 8512215.
211. See Crimaldi, supra note 25.
212. See id.
213. See In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 1999).
20051
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is equitable, and a judge may decide to
simply let the case survive the motion and use other opportunities to
balance the equities in the case.2 "4  For example, good faith can be
analyzed at a later point in the process if necessary-specifically at
plan confirmation.215 At that point, if a court found that the solution
proposed in the diocese's plan was not in good faith, then it could
refuse to extend the diocese's exclusive right to file a plan and could
allow other parties in interest, including the claimants' committee, to
propose a plan.216 If a court is unable to confirm a plan, the case most
likely will be dismissed.217 In the meantime, all parties in interest
have the opportunity to work out a solution that is fair not only to the
dioceses, the present sex-abuse claimants, and any other creditors, but
also is fair to any future claimants who have not yet become aware of
their injuries.218 Further, to the extent that the sex-abuse claimants'
motion relies on a shielding assets argument, the bankruptcy judge
can render that argument moot, because it is ultimately the judge,
guided by the Code, who decides what assets are available to pay the
sex-abuse victims.
214. The Third Circuit in SGL Carbon asserted that, for Chapter 11 petitioners, "[t~he
'good faith' requirement has strong roots in equity." 200 F.3d at 161; see also Langenkamp
v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 44 (1990) (per curiam) (noting that bankruptcy jurisdiction is
equitable jurisdiction); In re Nancant, Inc., 8 B.R. 1005, 1006 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981)
("The court will be able to consider other factors as they arise, and use its equitable
powers to reach an appropriate result in individual cases. [What constitutes cause for
dismissal under § 1112(b)] is subject to judicial discretion under the circumstances of each
case."). But see Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Little
Creek Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir. 1986) (asserting that the good faith
standard "furthers the balancing process between the interests of debtors and creditors
which characterizes so many provisions of the bankruptcy laws and is necessary to
legitimize the delay and costs imposed upon parties to a bankruptcy").
215. As the Johns-Manville court pointed out, § 1129(a)(3) of the Code requires that
the debtor's plan be proposed in good faith in order for it to be confirmed. In re Johns-
Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 735 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
216. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(3) (Supp. V 2005).
217. See id. § 1112(b)(4)(J) (permitting a court to dismiss a case for "cause" including
"failure to ... confirm a plan").
218. To the extent that the sex-abuse claims against the dioceses are seen as analogous
to the asbestos-related injuries, the words of the Johns-Manville court are instructive: "[i]t
is undeniable that these proceedings will result in a delivery system for [debtor's] tort
claimants, whether in the present questionably efficient tort system, a newly-created
claims-estimation facility, or another form." 36 B.R. at 742.
Indeed, when a religious organization files for bankruptcy, the phrase "good faith"
is imbued with extra meaning. Consider that there is also a moral argument from the
dioceses' point of view: during an extended process the dioceses themselves might come
to the conclusion that they should dismiss their cases. One commentator has observed
that although the dioceses need to have a workable solution to the sex-abuse claims to
ensure continued ministry, their "principal objective must be to minister to those who
have been abused-the victims." Skeel, supra note 25, at 1197-98.
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III. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE: THE DIOCESE-PARISH PROPERTY
ISSUE
A. Diocesan Property Under the Bankruptcy Code
Assuming that the good faith requirement, however construed, is
met, the most challenging phase of the bankruptcy case will be
deciding which assets become property of the estate.219 It is this phase
in which two areas of law, state corporate law and church canon law,
in addition to the Code, are most relevant. Again, the determination
as to what constitutes property of the estate is crucial because it
determines the minimum distribution available to the sex-abuse
claimants and other creditors.220
The Bankruptcy Code is the starting point. Under § 541(a)(1),
"property of the estate" is defined as "all legal or equitable interests
of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case. "221
Any property of the estate is protected from creditors upon filing of a
bankruptcy petition, which operates as an automatic stay.222 The
automatic stay is "applicable to all entities," preventing the start or
continuation of most legal proceedings against the debtor for which
the claims at issue arose before the filing of the petition.223 The
automatic stay applies not only to most legal proceedings against the
debtor, but also to enforcement of pre-petition judgments and to
various other "acts," including, but not limited to, an act to take
possession of property and an act to collect a claim that arose pre-
petition.224  This means all lawsuits against the dioceses were
automatically stayed at the moment they filed their petition.
Additionally, any claimant who settled or won a claim against a
diocese pre-petition was prevented from collecting on that settlement
or judgment.225 In a Chapter 11 case the stay remains in effect until
the debtor is granted a discharge.226 Discharge does not occur in a
219. See § 541 (outlining the process of analyzing property of the estate).
220. See id. §§ 1141, 1129(a)(7).
221. Id. § 541(a)(1).
222. Id. § 362.
223. Id. § 362(a), (a)(1).
224. Id. § 362(a)(2), (3).
225. This is an example of how the Bankruptcy Code aims to treat all creditors
equitably. Here, those claimants who already resolved their claims with the dioceses
would not be in a better position than those who had claims still pending or even those
who had claims and had not filed them for an acceptable reason.
226. § 362(c)(2). But prior to the ending of the stay, a party in interest may request
relief from the stay "for cause" and if cause is shown the court may terminate, annul,
modify, or condition the stay. Id. § 362(d)(1).
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Chapter 11 case until after the reorganization plan is confirmed.227
The debtor has 120 days after filing for Chapter 11 to file a plan and
180 days after filing to have the plan approved by each class of
claimants before other parties in interest, including claimant
committees, can file an alternate plan.228  This 120-day period of
exclusivity can be extended by the court.229 In order for any plans to
be confirmed they must be accepted by each class of claimants230 or
confirmed by the court pursuant to the "cramdown" provisions of
§ 1129(b). 231  The term "cramdown" is jargon used by practitioners
and judges to refer to confirmation of a plan notwithstanding its
rejection by certain creditors.232 The court may confirm the plan
under the cramdown provisions if it has been accepted by at least one
impaired class,233 does not discriminate unfairly,23' and is fair and
equitable.235  The process of plan proposal, acceptance, and
confirmation takes a lot of time. For the sex-abuse claimants in the
diocesan bankruptcies this process delays any chance they have to sue
the dioceses and, in the event a plan is confirmed (whether by
consensus or cramdown), eliminates any recourse for them outside
the provisions of the plan.236
The automatic stay protects the property of the estate so that it
may be kept intact in order to pay creditors in an equitable manner
while funding the debtor's reorganization. So, while the debtor gets a
breathing spell as a result of the automatic stay, the debtor also loses
considerable control over its own property. The bankruptcy court has
jurisdiction over property of the estate while the case is before the
227. Id. § 524(g)(1)(A).
228. Id. § 1121(c).
229. Id. § 1121(d)(1) (providing, in pertinent part, "[oln request of a party in interest
.. and after notice and a hearing, the court may for cause reduce or increase the 120-day
period or the 180-day period"); see also cases cited supra note 75 (illustrating how courts
have found cause for a variety of reasons). But see supra note 76 (noting BAPCPA's
addition of § 1121(d)(2) which limits the time period for these extensions).
230. § 1129(a)(8).
231. Id. § 1129(b).
232. See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY ALEXANDER WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 843 (4th ed. 2001) ("If all classes accept the plan, then it is
consensual and there is no need to cram down.").
233. § 1129(a)(10), (b)(1). Generally speaking, a class is impaired unless it is
completely protected by the plan-i.e., the class is not being deprived of any of its
nonbankruptcy rights. See id. § 1124(d) (providing that classes must maintain legal,
equitable, or contractual rights).
234. Id. § 1129(b)(1).
235. Id. § 1129(b)(1); see also id. § 1129(b)(2) (stating the requirements a plan must
meet to be found "fair and equitable").
236. Id. § 1141(d)(1)(A).
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court.237 Once in bankruptcy, a debtor must get court approval to
"use, sell, or lease" any property unless it is doing so in "the ordinary
course of business. "238
At any point in the case a court may also appoint a trustee "for
cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross
mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management
... [or] ... if such appointment is in the interests of creditors ... and
other interests of the estate. ' '239 This power of the court suggests that
the drafters of the Code may never have fully contemplated that
religious organizations like the diocese would file for bankruptcy
because such an appointment seems highly unlikely; it would be
tantamount to government takeover of a diocese, which has obvious
First Amendment implications. 4 °
There are certain provisions that also work well to safeguard sex-
abuse claimants' interests in the diocesan bankruptcy. Any
reorganization plan filed by the debtor would have to be approved by
each class of claimants241 or confirmed according to the cramdown
provisions.242 In the former situation the class of sex-abuse claimants
gets to vote directly for the plan, and in the latter the claimants have
the right to argue about the fairness and equity of the plan with
237. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(e)(1) (Supp. V 2005) (giving the court "exclusive jurisdiction
... of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of the
case").
238. 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(b)(1) (Supp. V 2005).
239. Id. § 1104(a)(1)-(2).
240. This would presumably burden the free exercise of religion, thus violating the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. But see S. REP.
No. 95-989, at 32 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5818 (noting that § 303 of
the Code exempts "[e]leemosynary institutions, such as churches, schools, and charitable
organizations and foundations" from having involuntary petitions filed against them).
This seems to suggest that the possibility of a church bankruptcy was contemplated (and
rejected)-at least in the involuntary context.
Another instance in which it does not appear that the bankruptcy filing of a
religious entity was fully contemplated is where, under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 2004, creditors and other parties in interest have the right to examine the
debtor, its assets, and its officers. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004. In the diocesan bankruptcy
context, creditors, claimants, and parishes will be able to force the diocese to open its
books. This could be problematic from the dioceses' perspectives because they generally
are not subject to much external financial oversight. In fact, churches (unlike secular, tax-
exempt nonprofits) do not have to file federal income tax returns in order to substantiate
or maintain their tax-exempt status. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.508-1(a)(3)(i)(a) (2001). However,
because the dioceses filed their cases with the bankruptcy court, they would have trouble
arguing that its rules of discovery should not apply to them. Under this rule of discovery,
the claimants would have much greater access to examine the dioceses' financial records
than they would outside bankruptcy.
241. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(8).
242. Id. § 1129(b).
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respect to their class.243 This points to one of the strengths of the
bankruptcy process: it requires the debtor to work with creditors to
find a workable solution for both. Though the claimants will not
necessarily have their days in court, their time in the judicial process
may be well spent in that they will be guaranteed payment of some
sort without the expense and potential adverse outcome resulting
from drawn out litigation and the possibility of a judgment-proof
defendant if claimants are last in line with their claims.24
In summary, plan acceptance permits the sex-abuse claimants to
participate in the process of determining how the property of the
dioceses will be distributed to them. Determining what property will
be subject to the provisions of the plan-the property of the estate-
is a crucial determination that must be made by the bankruptcy judge,
applying the provisions of the Code to the special assets owned by the
dioceses. It is in this application that a judge will likely have to
consider two other sources of law: church canon law and state
corporate law.
B. Diocesan Property Under Church Canon Law and State
Corporate Law
Church canon law is relevant to the diocese-parish property issue
because it is the basis on which the dioceses argue that they merely
hold the assets in trust for the parishes. In fact, the dioceses'
contentions are supported by a recent ruling by the Roman Catholic
Church's (the "Church") governing body, the Vatican. In that ruling,
the Vatican said that the Archdiocese of Boston is not automatically
entitled to the assets of parishes it has closed.245 Among the diocesan
cases, the bankruptcy court in the Spokane case addressed the
application of canon law to the definition of property of the estate.246
243. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting appointment of committees to
represent the sex-abuse claimants).
244. The argument certainly exists that some claimants will get a smaller award than
they otherwise would through litigation. However, the justice provided to individual
claimants takes a second priority to the justice provided to claimants as a class in the
bankruptcy context. The goal of the bankruptcy process is to treat all creditors fairly.
Thus, claimants who sued the dioceses before other claimants will have no advantage as
they would outside bankruptcy. Outside of bankruptcy, claimants who sued earlier faced
less risk that the dioceses would not be able to pay their claims due to depletion of assets
over time.
245. See Nicholas K. Geranios, Ruling on Assets Buoys Diocese, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug.
13, 2005, at B3, available at 2005 WLNR 12775999.
246. See Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic




Although the court ultimately declined to apply canon law definitions
of property,247 it did discuss its possible application at length, focusing
mainly on the First Amendment implications,248 which are discussed
in more detail in Part IV.B, infra. The judge in the Spokane case also
noted that both the diocese and the claimants submitted competing
interpretations of the diocese-parish relationship under canon law.249
This suggests that the sex-abuse claimants take the diocese's canon
law argument seriously. Thus, a brief overview of the Church's
structure and law is relevant to understanding the diocesan positions
in the diocese-parish property issue.
The Church is a hierarchical church, governed by its own canon
law, Codex Iris Canonic, last revised in 1983 (the "1983 Canon
Code").25 °  The power of the Church is divided into legislative,
executive, and judicial power.251 Diocesan bishops appointed by the
Pope have executive power over the particular dioceses, which
include subdivisions called parishes, 252 to which the bishops are
appointed. 3 This executive power is "interpreted widely" and can be
delegated. 254  Though the bishop has power over the parishes, the
parishes are recognized as "juridical persons" by the Church, meaning
they are "subjects of obligations and rights" under Canon law.255
Among these recognized rights is property ownership. 6  Property
acquired by juridical persons belongs to those juridical persons.257
This means that, under the 1983 Canon Code, parishes own any
property that they have acquired.
The 1983 Canon Code recognizes the parishes as separate legal
entities from the diocese, 258 but state corporate law does not. Most
states, including Oregon and Washington, recognize a special
247. See id. at *12-16.
248. See id. at *14-16.
249. See id. at *12 (noting "[tihe claimants dispute [the diocese's] interpretation of
canon law and cite, again at great length, contrary provisions of the canon law").
250. 1983 CODE c.12 § 1. See generally John J. Coughlin, The Clergy Sexual Abuse
Crisis and the Spirit of Canon Law, 44 B.C. L. REV. 977 (2003) (discussing how the 1983
Canon Code addresses certain aspects of the Catholic sex-abuse crisis). The Church's
hierarchical structure is particularly relevant to the First Amendment issues discussed in
Part IV.B, infra.
251. 1983 CODE c.135 § 1.
252. Id. c.515 § 1.
253. Id. c.134 § 1.
254. Id. c.138.
255. Id. c.113 § 2.
256. Id. c.1256.
257. Id.
258. Id.; Steve Woodward, Archdiocese Will Argue Assets Are Parish-Specific,
OREGONIAN (Portland), Jan. 30, 2005, at B01, available at 2005 WLNR 6478435.
2005]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
corporate form for dioceses called the corporation sole." 9 Under this
corporate form the bishop is incorporated in his capacity as bishop,
not as an individual.2" Moreover, the churches, parishes, and other
entities under the bishop are not separately incorporated. 261 The
form permits the diocese to be governed by canon law instead of the
state's corporate law while still being recognized as a corporation for
most legal purposes.262 In contrast with most other corporate forms,
there are no members or shareholders in a corporation sole.263
Although the corporation sole is recognized as a corporation, one
commentator has noted that there is a "strong argument ... that the
corporation sole's historical development cast[s] it in the nature of a
trust, rather than a modern corporation. a2 6  State law is generally
silent as to whether assets of parishes held by the bishop (i.e., assets in
which title is held in his name) must be exclusively used for his
benefit or that of the diocese.265 In the Spokane case, the bankruptcy
court determined that real property held in the bishop's name
belonged to the diocese and was not held in trust for the parishes.266
In making this determination, the court did not apply canon law but,
rather, applied state law and the Bankruptcy Code.267 This suggests
that the courts will give more weight to state law than canon law.
However, the Spokane diocese argued strongly that failure to apply
canon law to the diocese-parish property issue burdens the free
exercise of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment.268
The diocese has not backed down from this position and has appealed
the bankruptcy court's ruling.2 69 This suggests that the Spokane
bankruptcy court's ruling probably is not the final decision on this
matter.
Although state law is silent on the duties of the bishop to the
parishes, canon law is not. The bishop is required to "honor the
259. See OR. REV. STAT. § 65.067(1) (1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 24.12.010 (2002).
260. See OR. REV. STAT. § 65.067(1); WASH. REV. CODE § 24.12.010.
261. See OR. REV. STAT. § 65.067(1); WASH. REV. CODE § 24.12.010.
262. See OR. REV. STAT. § 65.067(1); WASH. REV. CODE § 24.12.010.
263. See OR. REV. STAT. § 65.067(1); WASH. REV. CODE § 24.12.010.
264. See Church Bankruptcy Questions, supra note 78.
265. See id.
266. Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic Bishop of
Spokane), No. 05-80038-PCW, 2005 WL 2108895, at *22-23 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Aug. 26,
2005) (holding that the bishop, as a natural person, holds assets in trust for the diocese, not
the parishes, thus the assets are part of the debtor diocese's estate).
267. Id. at *12-16.
268. Id. at *14.
269. Janet I. Tu, Spokane Diocese Appeals Court Ruling, SEATLE TIMES, Sept. 7,
2005, at B7, available at 2005 WLNR 14113356.
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intent of the parishioners that assets be used in their parishes." '
Canon law states that the donors who give the money to acquire the
assets determine the ownership of those assets.27' Where parishioners
donate money to acquire certain assets, those parishioners own the
assets through the parish.272 Both the Portland archdiocese and the
Spokane diocese take the position that assets of the parishes are held
in trust for the parishes according to canon law.273 This reasoning
would exclude parish assets from the debtor's estate under § 541(d) of
the Code, because only the diocese's legal title, not any equitable
interest in the trust, comes into the estate. In Portland, the sex-abuse
claimants committee has responded to this argument by arguing that
the diocese is not separate from the parishes under state law and thus
parish assets are diocesan assets.274 In Spokane, the bankruptcy court
has sided with the claimants by determining that any trust that exists
under state law places legal title in the bishop, as a natural person,
and beneficial title in the diocese, not the parishes.275
The positions of the opposing litigants are clear. The sex-abuse
claimants rely on the Bankruptcy Code and state law to argue that the
only legally cognizable entity is the diocese. Thus, all assets held by
organizations under the dioceses belong to the dioceses. In contrast,
the dioceses argue that state corporate law gives them the power to
be governed by their own internal rules-which, in turn, they argue
vest only limited control of parish property in the diocese. The merits
of these arguments are likely to be the most difficult determination
for the bankruptcy court in each diocese case.276 The Spokane
bankruptcy court has already made this difficult determination, ruling
that real property used by the parishes is part of the diocese's
bankruptcy estate because, under state law, title to the property is
held by the bishop.277 In reaching this decision, the court discussed
270. Church Bankruptcy Questions, supra note 78; see also 1983 CODE c.1284 (setting
out the duties of bishops with respect to parish assets, including, to "be vigilant that no
goods placed in their care in any way perish or suffer damage").
271. 1983 CODE c.1267 § 1.
272. Church Bankruptcy Questions, supra note 78.
273. In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 2005 WL 2108895, at *14 (describing the
position of the Spokane diocese); Woodward, supra note 258 (describing the position of
the Portland archdiocese).
274. Woodward, supra note 258.
275. In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 2005 WL 2108895, at *18.
276. See Woodward, supra note 258 (noting the arguments on both sides of the
property debate); Steve Woodward, Archdiocese Lists Nine Parishes, One School for Test
Case of Assets, OREGONIAN (Portland), Feb. 1, 2005, at B04, available at 2005 WLNR
6478924 (noting Bankruptcy Judge Elizabeth Perris's request that the diocese apply its
argument that parish assets are held in trust to ten church properties).
277. In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 2005 WL 2108895, at *22.
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the First Amendment implications of applying state and federal law
instead of canon law to determine the ownership of the real
property.278 Ultimately, the court decided that applying secular law
did not impermissibly burden the free exercise of religion.279  The
Diocese of Spokane is appealing this decision, arguing, among other
things, that the court did "not giv[e] ... [canon] law sufficient weight
in determining parish ownership. '280  The issue of the appropriate
weight to give canon law in the diocese-parish property debate
implicates the First Amendment.281 These implications are discussed
in more detail in the next Part of this Comment.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIOCESE-
PARISH PROPERTY ISSUE
A. Case Law: Ecclesiastical Abstention and Neutrality
The Spokane court discussed the application of the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine when deciding the diocese-parish issue. This
doctrine mandates, in certain situations, judicial deference to
decisions made by religious leaders. The doctrine finds its roots in
the case of Watson v. Jones' where the United States Supreme Court
wrote:
The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of
no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize
voluntary religious associations ... and to create tribunals for
the decision of controverted questions of faith within the
association ... is unquestioned .... It is of the essence of these
religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the
decision of questions arising among themselves, that those
decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical
cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself
provides for.283
278. Id. at *14-17.
279. Id. at *17.
280. Tu, supra note 269.
281. In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 2005 WL 2108895, at *14-17.
282. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). Since Watson, the doctrine has evolved to draw
distinctions between questions of faith and secular questions of church property and
business. See infra notes 309-12 and accompanying text.
283. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728-29.
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The doctrine is a product of the judicial interpretation of the First
Amendment, though it is unclear if its roots are in the Establishment
Clause or the Free Exercise Clause.284
A key case that highlights the Establishment Clause-Free
Exercise blending found in the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,285 where the
United States Supreme Court vacated the Supreme Court of Illinois's
ruling that the Serbian church's defrocking of a priest was arbitrary
and that it had no authority to reorganize the diocese as it did.286 The
church in this case was organized as a not-for-profit organization
under Illinois state law.2 87 The bishop in question had been removed
for acts of defiance and violation of his oath.288 There was also a basic
dispute over who controlled certain assets of the church, specifically
over the church's decision to create three new dioceses.2 89  The
United States Supreme Court found that the First Amendment was
implicated, because the Supreme Court of Illinois had been called on
to undertake "extensive" review of "decisions of the highest
ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity. ' 29° The
United States Supreme Court found that the state court's review was
improper because, in such situations, the civil court should "accept
such decisions as binding on them, in their application to the religious
issues of doctrine or polity before them. '29' Though there was a
property dispute involved, the Court found it to be essentially a
religious dispute "which under our cases is for ecclesiastical and not
civil tribunals. ' '292
284. See Christopher R. Farrel, Note, Ecclesiastical Abstention and the Crisis in the
Catholic Church, 19 J.L. & POL. 109 (2003), where the author notes:
[Tihe Court has been unclear as to the precise textual source of the doctrine-i.e.,
whether the doctrine is a product of the Free Exercise Clause or of the
Establishment Clause-because while the cases tend to cast the matter in terms of
the free exercise of religion, they also make numerous references to the
"entanglement" of church and state, which is a hallmark of Establishment Clause
analysis.
Id. at 116.
285. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
286. Id. at 698, 724-25.
287. Id. at 701.
288. Id. at 705.
289. Id. at 701.
290. Id. at 709.
291. Id. (citation omitted).
292. Id.
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Notably, the Court rejected an exception to the ecclesiastical
doctrine.2 193  This "arbitrariness exception" from Gonzalez v.
Archbishop294 was rejected because, according to the Milivojevich
Court, review permitted by it "must inherently entail inquiry into the
procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the
church judicatory to follow, or else into the substantive criteria by
which they are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question. 295
The Court concluded that because the Serbian church's higher
ecclesiastical body had ruled on the questions before it, the state
supreme court should have deferred to its ruling.296  It held that
"[w]hen [as permitted by the First Amendment,] ecclesiastical
tribunals are created to decide disputes over the government and
direction of subordinate bodies, the Constitution requires that civil
courts accept their decisions as binding upon them.2197 However, one
issue the Court did not reach was "[w]hether corporate bylaws or
other documents governing the individual property-holding
corporations may affect any desired disposition of the Diocesan
property" because that was "not a question before [it]. '298 In essence
the Court did not decide the property question before it that would,
like the present diocesan bankruptcies, implicate property definitions
under state corporate law that conflict with those under church law.
The Milivojevich Court did note that a civil court might be permitted
to intervene in narrow circumstances where a church "acts in bad
faith ... for secular purposes. "299
There was certainly precedent for the strong ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine of Milivojevich.3° However, Justice Rehnquist, in
a dissenting opinion, read this precedent quite differently. He first
noted that "the jurisdiction of [the] court was invoked by [the church
293. Id. at 713.
294. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
295. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713. The Gonzalez Court held that absent "fraud,
collusion, or arbitrariness," the civil court should defer on purely ecclesiastical matters.
Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16.
296. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 724-25.
297. Id. at 724.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 713.
300. See, e.g., Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the
allocation of power within a [hierarchical] church so as to decide ... religious law ...
would violate the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil determination of
religious doctrine."); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)
("[T]he First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in
resolving church property disputes.").
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leadership], who sought an injunction establishing their control over
property" of the church.310 Further, he found:
[T]here was nothing to suggest that [the Supreme Court of
Illinois's opinion] was based upon anything but commonsense
rules for deciding an intraorganizational dispute: in an
organization which has provided for majority rule through
certain procedures, a minority's attempt to usurp that rule and
those procedures need be given no effect by civil courts.30 2
Justice Rehnquist particularly highlighted Maryland & Virginia
Churches v. Sharpsburg Church,"3 where the United States Supreme
Court affirmed a state court's dismissal of two actions brought by
church leadership to prevent two churches from withdrawing from its
association." The state court in that case based its decision on
consideration of state law, deed language, corporate charters, and the
church constitution.3 5 In Rehnquist's view the proper application of
the First Amendment in the Serbian church case did not invoke the
Free Exercise Clause but, rather, the Establishment Clause.306  He
found nothing violative of the Free Exercise Clause in the state
court's ruling, and, on the contrary, found it to be a proper
"application of neutral principles of law consistent with the decisions
of this Court. '3 7  Rehnquist warned that by rubber-stamping the
decisions of the church hierarchy based on Free Exercise concerns,
the majority "create[d] far more serious problems under the
Establishment Clause.
30 8
Rehnquist's dissent was a harbinger of things to come in the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. In Jones v. Wolf, 309 the
Court held that states may handle church property disputes in any
manner that does not require consideration of matters of church
doctrine.30  The Court specifically upheld the application of basic
property and trust law because they were "objective, well-established
301. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 725 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 729.
303. 396 U.S. 367 (1970).
304. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 731-32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 732. Rehnquist noted that the Court in Sharpsburg Church "dismissed the
Eldership's contention that this judgment violated the First Amendment for want of a
substantial federal question." Id.
306. Id. at 733 ("The rule [from the Establishment Clause] ... is that the government
may not displace the free religious choices of its citizens by placing its weight behind a
particular religious belief, tenet, or sect.").
307. Id. at 733-34.
308. Id. at 734.
309. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
310. Id. at 602.
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concepts."3"' Jones implies that the Court will decide property issues
before it when it can apply neutral principles without delving too
deeply into church law. Since Jones, the Court's Free Exercise
jurisprudence has taken a decidedly "neutralist" turn, meaning the
Court is willing to apply "neutral, generally applicable law" in a First
Amendment case unless the case also implicates another
constitutional principle. l
B. Application to the Diocesan Bankruptcies
Though the Court has not decided an ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine case since it took a more neutralist approach to the First
Amendment in Employment Division v. Smith313 and City of Boerne v.
Flores,"' the approach is helpful in understanding how the Court
might analyze the property question in the diocesan bankruptcies,
should the issue come before it.315 As a preliminary matter, it should
be noted that there is-in addition to ecclesiastical abstention-
another type of abstention that can be exercised specifically by a
bankruptcy court. Under § 305 of the Code, a bankruptcy court may
"dismiss a case ... or... suspend all proceedings in a case under this
title, at any time if... the interests of creditors and the debtor would
be better served by such dismissal or suspension." '316 The plain
language of the statute says that such a dismissal "is not reviewable by
appeal or otherwise by the court of appeals ... or by the Supreme
Court of the United States. 31 7 The constitutionality of this provision
has been questioned318 and indeed some courts of appeal have
311. Id. at 603.
312. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) ("We have never held
that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid
law...."); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513-14 (1997) (establishing that
Employment Division v. Smith controls where a neutral, generally applicable law is
challenged under the Free Exercise Clause, but where the law is neither neutral nor
generally applicable, the state must show a "compelling interest" for burdening the free
exercise of religion).
313. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
314. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
315. See Farrel, supra note 284, at 121-34 (discussing the "rise of neutrality" and its
implications for the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine).
316. 11 U.S.C.A. § 305(a)(1) (Supp. V 2005).
317. Id. § 305(c); see also S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 35 (1978), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5821 ("A principle of the common law requires a court with
jurisdiction over a particular matter to take jurisdiction. This section recognizes that there
are cases in which it would be appropriate for the court to decline jurisdiction.").
318. Farmer v. First Va. Bank, 22 B.R. 488, 490 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982) (holding that
subsections 305(a) and (c) are unconstitutional to the extent that they attempt to bar
review of constitutional issues). But see Chem. Bank v. Togut (In re Axona Int'l Credit &
Commerce Ltd.), 924 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the fact that § 305 does not
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reviewed abstention decisions made by bankruptcy courts under
§ 305.319
However, it seems unlikely that § 305 abstention will be
exercised given that the Tucson plan has been confirmed,2 ° the
Portland case has begun its second year,321 and the court in Spokane
has squarely taken on the diocese-parish property issue.322 The
Spokane case gives the best preview of how the First Amendment
issues may play out in the diocesan bankruptcies.
The Spokane court addressed First Amendment issues 323 when
responding to the diocese's assertions that the Free Exercise Clause
precluded the court's examination of canon law and required the
court to accept the diocese's interpretation of canon law without
further inquiry.324 The court stated that the diocese "argue[s] that no
civil court has authority to even examine the rights of [claimants] to
church property as those rights are determined by internal church
doctrine. ' 31
The Spokane court responded to this argument by noting that
the diocese offered no case law to support its contention that parties
who have monetary claims against a religious organization are bound
by the internal laws of that religious organization.3 6 The court went
on to do its own case law analysis, citing, among other cases, Watson,
Jones, and Milivojevich.327  The court cited these cases as part of a
"long line of Supreme Court cases address[ing] resolution of property
disputes among members of religious organization. '328  While
bar review by district courts prevents the section from violating Article III of the
Constitution).
319. See Cash Currency Exch., Inc. v. Shine (In re Cash Currency Exch., Inc.), 37 B.R.
617, 630 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (finding that appeal of abstention order is reviewable if it raises
jurisdictional issues), affd 762 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Bailey's Beauticians Supply
Co., 671 F.2d 1063, 1067 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding that the bankruptcy court's discretion
under § 305 is broad and that its decision to dismiss in the best interests of the parties
should only be reversed on abuse of that discretion).
320. See Kornman, supra note 18 (noting that the bankruptcy judge approved the
diocese's Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization plan).
321. See Woodward, supra note 83 (noting the Portland bankruptcy judge's decision to
extend the diocese's time to file a plan until November 15, 2005-more that sixteen
months after the diocese filed its Chapter 11 petition on July 7, 2004).
322. See Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic
Bishop of Spokane), No. 05-80038-PCW, 2005 WL 2108895, at *22 (Bankr. E.D. Wash.
Aug. 26,2005).
323. Id. at *14-17.
324. Id. at *14.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at *14-15.
328. Id. at *15.
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acknowledging that these cases addressed court deference to
decisions made within hierarchical churches like the Roman Catholic
Church, the court distinguished the diocese-parish property dispute as
being a secular dispute-i.e., not an intrachurch dispute like those in
Watson, Jones, Milivojevich, and the other cases.329  The court
emphasized that the case before it was "a purely secular dispute
between creditors and a bankruptcy debtor, albeit one which is a
religious organization. 330 Further, the court noted, the intrachurch
parties-the diocese and its parishioners-were on the same side of
the issue, both arguing that the real property in question belonged to
the parishes, not the dioceses. 3
Since this dispute was not an intrachurch dispute, the Spokane
court concluded that the key First Amendment question was whether
the application of the Bankruptcy Code and state law resulted in a
substantial burden on the diocese's free exercise of religion.332 The
court noted that, as a general rule, the court itself-as a government
actor-could apply facially neutral and generally applicable laws like
the Code and state law even if its application placed an "incidental"
burden on religion.33  However, if its application placed an "undue or
substantial burden" on the exercise of religion, the court would have
to demonstrate that it had a compelling interest in applying the
laws.33 ' But the court noted, this "compelling interest" inquiry was
only necessary if the application of the Code and state law was a
substantial burden on the exercise of religion.335
The Spokane court concluded that its application of the Code
and state law to determine who owned the property at issue did not
place a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion.336 The
court pointed out that religious organizations, like the diocese, exist
in a secular world.3 7 Consequently, they engage in many secular
activities-such as owning property and transacting business with
secular parties.338 Further, the activities giving rise to the dispute
between the diocese and sex-abuse claimants-that led the diocese
329. Id. at *15-16.




334. Id. (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
335. Id.
336. Id. at *17.




into bankruptcy court-were secular at their core: alleged tortious
acts of priests and the dioceses.3 3 9 The court noted that the diocese's
alleged liability was predicated on secular, state law-not church
doctrine or religious beliefs.34 ° The court also observed that filing for
bankruptcy is a secular activity and that "[i]t is not a burden on a
religious organization which voluntarily seeks the protection of the
bankruptcy laws to require it to treat its creditors in the same manner
as any other debtor." '341 Thus, the court concluded that application of
federal bankruptcy law-particularly § 541, which defines "property
of the estate"-and state law did not substantially burden the free
exercise of religion.342
The ultimate result of the Spokane court's ruling was that
property held in title by the bishop-even if it was used and
controlled by the parishes-became property of the debtor diocese's
estate." This means the property can be used to pay off claimants
under the diocese's reorganization plan, thus increasing the number
of assets available for that purpose. The decision is a setback for the
Diocese of Spokane, which had hoped to shield those assets from
becoming part of the bankruptcy estate. The diocese has appealed
the decision and seems ready to stand by its argument that failure to
give due weight to canon law-which defines property rights within
the Roman Catholic Church-impermissibly burdens the free
exercise of religion.3" It will be interesting to watch what becomes of
this argument and whether it will carry the day in another, higher
court. What does seem clear from the Spokane case is that the thrust
of the First Amendment arguments will be the Free Exercise Clause,
not the Establishment Clause. However, if the diocese prevails at
some point, the sex-abuse claimants may bring an Establishment
Clause argument, asserting that the government-through its
courts-has impermissibly favored the diocesan debtor by not
applying the same law it would to secular debtors.
As a final thought, it should be noted that the dioceses' access to
and potential emergence from the bankruptcy process has
important-and possibly very positive-implications for the free
exercise of religion. The opportunity to apply neutral principles of
law to assist the dioceses and the sex-abuse claimants while achieving
339. Id. at *16-17.
340. Id. at *16.
341. Id. at *17.
342. Id.
343. Id. at *22.
344. See Tu, supra note 269 (noting the Diocese of Spokane's decision to appeal).
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both of their goals furthers the free exercise of religion. To the extent
the dioceses are able to emerge from the process with their financial
health intact, they will be able to continue to provide a forum for the
exercise of their parishioners' faith. And to the extent the dioceses
are able to actually pay something to all victims with valid claims,
they may be well on their way to making amends for some of the
harm with which the dioceses and their priests have been charged.
CONCLUSION
While there are valid arguments that the sex-abuse claims should
not be handled in the bankruptcy context,345 the pertinent fact is that
they are being handled that way, for the time being, in Portland,
Tucson, and Spokane. Whether the sex-abuse claims should be
handled in bankruptcy has not been the focus of this Comment.
Rather, the focus has been on whether the bankruptcy process as it
exists, in the context of the current Code and current case law, is able
to handle this unique filing. Considering precedent, statutory
language, and constitutional concerns, this Comment concludes that it
can. While the Chapter 11 filings of several Catholic dioceses
represent a new challenge for the Bankruptcy Code, ultimately the
345. There are certainly arguments against the handling of sex-abuse claims in
bankruptcy court. Unless relief from the automatic stay is granted, few claims will ever be
litigated once the church files. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(d)(1) (Supp. V. 2005) (requiring the
court to lift the stay if a party in interest moves to have the stay lifted and the court find
"cause" to lift the stay); see also id. § 524(a)(2) (stating that discharge "operates as an
injunction against the commencement or continuation of any action" against the debtor
for debts discharged in bankruptcy). Claimants do still have the right to a jury trial
because their claims are of the personal injury variety-unless they consent to another
method of dispute resolution. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(5); 28 U.S.C. § 1411 (2000). The
latter is likely, especially since the sex-abuse claimants are being represented as a group
and many will likely opt to handle the claims in an expedited mediation format. The only
claims that will be litigated in the traditional sense are those filed post-petition arising
from acts occurring post-petition. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 362, 524 (limiting the application of
the automatic stay and discharge to claims arising before the filing of debtor's bankruptcy
petition). Considering the fact that many dioceses around the country have faced similar
issues and have decided to settle and pay out large sums, one could question whether the
dioceses who do file are really putting forward their best effort settle outside the
bankruptcy context. See supra notes 201-204 and accompanying text. Given all the
ambiguities and potential constitutional implications that a court presiding over the cases
must face, it might be better for these parties to reach settlements or litigate outside this
very technical, highly intrusive process. It is not always safe to assume that settlement is
the best route. For many victims and critics of the dioceses, it may be quite important for
them to have their days in court. The impact of the diocesan filings are that they
unilaterally foreclose that option to many plaintiffs.
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Code is written broadly enough and prescribes a process that is
equitable enough to meet this challenge.
ALLISON WALSH SMITH
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